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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF QUISLINGISM [1]

BY

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I will begin what I have to say with the following propositions. The two decisive factors on which the outcome of the war apparently depends are aircraft production and civilian moral. We need not therefore emphasize any further the importance of the latter subject, with which we are here concerned. It is, it is true, a wider field than that of Quislingism, but this constitutes not merely a special aspect of the whole: it is a chief and most important part of the whole. Furthermore, while we do not know what Hitler had in mind when he used the words 'secret weapon', there is no doubt that Quislingism and its many variants are Hitler's most valuable secret weapon, the one to which he mainly owes his spectacular successes both in his own and other countries. Although there is no reason to suppose that he has any conscious knowledge of the deep workings of his weapon, he has undoubtedly an intuitive grasp of the way in which certain aspects of human nature can be exploited to his advantage. His victims are singularly unaware of the process by which they are affected, so that it remains a *secret* even more to them than to those who engineer it. The form the phenomena in question have taken is a relatively new and startling one, a fact which in itself must engage the attention of any serious psychologist. The challenge to psycho-analysts is even more direct, inasmuch as the very secrecy and mystery with which the phenomena are invested indicate the operation of some deep agencies in the Unconscious, i.e. in the sphere of our special work. We have, therefore, strong motives, both practical and scientific, for trying to understand as much as possible about this important problem.

[1] Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, June 12, 1940.

My next proposition is that the key to the understanding of Quislingism and the other phenomena connected with it is that they are all based on a peculiar inability to face, or even to recognize, an enemy. By an enemy I mean someone whose interests and endeavours run diametrically counter to one's own, so that one has no other emotional relationship to him than an attitude of sheer opposition. It is not common for a situation of this degree of purity to arise in life, but it is of the utmost importance both for mental integrity and for the practical issue that an individual should be able to recognize and to face such a situation when it does arise. We are concerned here with the problem of how it is that many people fail to do so, especially at a critical juncture.

Let me turn now to some purely descriptive aspects of the matter. The problem of pure Quislingism, curious as it is, would not be so difficult were it not complicated by an extensive aura of attendant phenomena, the connection of which with Quislingism has been generally overlooked. Leaving on one side for the moment the fully developed Quislings, I would call your attention to the following types which I maintain represent stages in that development. All of them indicate either denial or else approval of the aggressiveness of the enemy, but the important point is that there is a curious connection between these two attitudes of denying and approving. At one end of the scale we have a person, perhaps a slum dweller, who says he would be no worse off under the Nazis and that it makes no difference to him who governs the country. Then we have the escapist who used to be sure that there would be no war, though still more sure that there need be no war, and maintained that it could be avoided either by talking matters over reasonably with the opponent or by the subjects on both sides refusing to fight; what this person refused to believe was that the opponent was determined to force a fight. A next step is shown by the man who admitted the presence of a certain amount of aggressiveness in the Nazi *régime*, but thought that this degree was so small that it could be allayed by giving it some vent, i.e. by the policy of appeasement. Such a man was particularly sensitive to the possibility of increasing the aggressivity by provocation. We come then to the man who admitted aggressiveness but held that it was mainly justified and in no way savage or irrational. He would assert that the English would have behaved in just the same way as the Germans if they had been debarred the full use of their own country, as the Germans were in the Rhineland, or forbidden to

unite with their compatriots such as the Austrians and Sudeten-Germans. This moral justification can pass over into actual admiration, such as that of the man who says ' We could do with a bit of Hitler here ' or is impressed by the efficiency and positive achievements of the Nazi *régime*. Even so the transition from this type to the fully-fledged Quisling is not an easy one and particular factors have to operate before it can be brought about.

There would appear to be two main classes of people who tend to be seduced into the more manifest Quisling direction : the dissatisfied and the insecure. Both of these elements may, of course, be present together. The experience of Austria in particular shows that the Nazi infiltration took place largely among dissatisfied and ambitious, often junior, members of firms, banks or Government departments. I can recall instances myself of men who had been previously dismissed for incapacity or dishonesty and who made out that they had been unfairly treated ; the motive of revenge is here evident. The element of disgruntled ambition may also be active among scions of the well-to-do classes. In the upper classes a special mechanism is sometimes at work, actuated by the fear that the privileged position of the person's class may be destroyed by what he would probably call Bolshevist tendencies. He deals with his fear of this by allying himself with the forces of destruction in the hope of emerging as a leader in the new *régime*. Such a person has often been afflicted with a sense of guilt about his privileged position, which for personal reasons he feels he does not deserve, and hopes to win back his self-esteem by allying himself with the forces that condemn such privileges ; his bad conscience has made him side with that condemnation. In all those types there is present a dissatisfaction with, or hostility to, the present rulers of the country.

Coming now to the psycho-analytical problem concerned, I may assume that every analyst has had ample evidence of the identification of the enemy in question with certain aspects of the formidable Father imago. The torture dreams about Hitler, and the still more revealing ones of friendly intimacy with him, are apt to occur in contexts that render this interpretation inevitable. Furthermore it becomes plain that the attitude towards the external persons is profoundly affected by the attitude of the ego towards his own internal objects, there being a constant tendency to identify the two. There is both introjection of, for instance, Nazi leaders and also projection of id impulses on to them. The cardinal attribute of what I have called the formidable

Father imago is his irresistibility. There are two main reactions to it, which are apparently opposed in kind. One consists in denying the person's serious aggressivity behind the irresistibility, i.e. in the denial of danger and therefore in the repression of fear. The second consists in admiration of the irresistibility, often, though not always, accompanied by the tendency to identify oneself with the irresistible person. Incidentally this provides a very nice problem for those in authority: if they decry the invincibility of the enemy they play into the hands of those who complacently deny his dangerousness, whereas if they emphasize his power so as to arouse the nation they run the risk of stimulating the morbid reaction to the idea of irresistibility with which we are here specially concerned. Fortunately the question can be properly answered by paying heed to the matter of tempo.

From my psycho-analytical data I have come to the conclusion that the fundamental process in these two apparently dissimilar reactions is really the same. It may be described as an attempt, often by devious and desperate devices, to convert the imago of the evil Father into that of a good one.

Now this attempt would surely in itself seem to be in a quite healthy direction, but everything depends on the way in which it is carried out. If it consists in strengthening the confidence in the internal good objects, with a corresponding diminution of anxiety about the dangers of the internal bad objects, then it is possible to effect a satisfactory identification between oneself and the friendly aspects of the Father imago. The Quisling direction, however, is quite other than this. A profound self-deception takes place. A belief is established in the power, in the inevitable success, and therefore in a sense in the goodness, of the internal evil objects and impulses, and this belief is then applied to the external enemy himself. The important step in this process is indicated by the word ' therefore '. Why should inevitable success be necessarily equated with goodness ? It sounds like the old doctrine that might makes right.

Subtle mechanisms may be at work here, some of which I shall presently indicate, but the fundamental reason underlying them would appear to be the identification of sadism with sexual potency.

Our starting-point in any constructive analysis must surely be the fear of the dangerous Father or of one's own dangerous impulses towards him. If one is unable to face this situation then there remain only two alternatives: to submit to him or to ally oneself with the

dangerous forces through the mechanisms of acceptance and identification. These alternatives are not so mutually exclusive as they might appear; often they are both operative in the same person. On the whole the former is more characteristic of the passive homosexual type, the latter of the active one. Both are *exquisitely homosexual solutions*, there being always some complex emotional relationship with the enemy in place of an attitude of *aloof opposition*. The fear is both sexualized and moralized. Passivity and masochism play an obvious part in the former process and I may quote an example of how this may be inter-related with the guilt factors that underlie the moralization. One patient maintained that Hitler's very insistence, and the enormous energy he has devoted to achieving his aim, in itself put him in the right. It turned out that insistent 'wanting' of that degree could only mean 'wanting back', so that Hitler had a right to demand the return of what had been taken from him, all this being of course rationalized in terms of Germany's reactions to the treaty of Versailles. The analytic point is that *primary* aggressive wanting was so repressed as to be inconceivable, though its existence was after all implied in the idea of the Father demanding back the penis of which he had been robbed. That this cannot be an isolated reaction is shown by the inactivity of the Allies for so many years under the illusion that Germany's conduct was a more or less proportionate response to the aggressivity of the Allies immediately after the last war and therefore need not be supposed to betoken any innate aggressivity of her own. Such is the revenge of a bad conscience: it tends to paralyse the power of resistance.

This type, in which the submission depends upon a secret hostility that cannot be accepted, is both more passive and more sexual than the next one we have to consider. Here we see the faint beginnings of a positive admiration. I am speaking of the type in which the idea of aggressivity is denied and the hope entertained that it should be possible to appease the enemy by making suitable concessions. The admiration may be somewhat masochistic and accompanied by the hope of obtaining a kind of protective security through coming to terms with the enemy. Politically this may go with a fear of 'Bolshevism', i.e. of a chaotic mob, which may afford grounds for identification with the powerful dictator. Perhaps this was the characteristic attitude in Denmark and Norway and it may be likened to that of the younger brother. The most complete forms of identification, however, occur where the homosexual trends are of a more active

kind. With such persons tyrannical tendencies are already present which render an identification easy. One imagines this to be so with the well-known Fascist leaders in the various countries. It is probable, however, that when the alliance is complete even the most active of these types is forced to regress to the deeper level of passive homosexuality. Mussolini will probably yet follow the path of Seyss-Inquart, Henlein and Major Quisling himself.

All we have said so far, though it may go some way to explaining the ambiguous attitude of various types towards the foreign dictator, does not account for the more heinous deed of betraying one's own country and shooting one's own countrymen. It is plain that here there must always have been present some divided attitude towards the latter. I have not had the occasion of analysing a fully-fledged traitor, but with several patients there has been present enough of the tendency to make me surmise that the secret of it lies in some unsatisfactory attitude towards the Mother. Treachery, by allying oneself with the conquering enemy, would seem to be an attempt sadistically to overcome the incest taboo by raping the Mother instead of loving her. Perhaps this is why it is generally regarded as the most outrageous and unnatural of crimes, since it combines disloyalty to both parents.

In conclusion I would suggest that the people who are most subject to the wiles of Nazi propaganda are those who have neither securely established their own manhood and independence of the Father nor have been able to combine the instincts of sexuality and love in their attitude towards the Mother or other women. This is the psychological position of the homosexual.

AGGRESSION FROM ANXIETY[1]

BY

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This communication is not intended to be a critique of Anna Freud's book, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (1), which has already been reviewed in these pages; it is merely a contribution to the discussion of a theme which is developed in the ninth chapter of that book. This aim has been facilitated both by the clarity and precision of the author's thought and by the conspicuous directness of her approach to the difficult psychological problems involved, qualities which are particularly noticeable in the second half of the book.

Let us take as our point of departure Aichhorn's case, cited in the chapter entitled 'Identification with the Aggressor', of a young boy who habitually reacted to the blame and reproaches of his teacher by making faces which caused the whole class to burst out laughing. These grimaces were simply a caricature of the angry expression of the teacher. When the boy had to face a scolding by the latter, he tried to master his anxiety by involuntarily imitating him. He identified himself with the teacher's anger and copied his expression as he spoke, though the imitation was not recognized. Through his grimaces he was assimilating himself to or identifying himself with the dreaded external object. A similar psychological development is seen in the other cases reported, a specially clear illustration being afforded by a little girl of six years, who by reproducing the attributes and deportment of her assailant transformed herself from the person threatened into the person who makes the threat.

Anna Freud observes that this process of transformation strikes us as more curious when the anxiety relates not to some event in the past but to something expected in the future. To illustrate this type of prophylactic reaction, she refers to the case of a boy who on certain occasions proceeded to accuse and abuse the very persons who had reason to complain of his naughtiness. In another case the aggressiveness displayed by a little boy was still more obviously designed to dramatize and forestall his fears. Anna Freud holds that this 'identification with the aggressor' forms a by no means uncommon middle

[1] First published in German, *Int. Z. Psychoanal.*, (1937), **23**, 306.

stage in the normal development of the super-ego. In these examples the internalized criticism is dissociated from the child's own reprehensible activity and turned back on the outside world. By means of a new defensive process identification with the aggressor is succeeded by an active assault on the outside world.

I do not attach great importance to the distinction made between the two kinds of reaction, according to whether the stimulus which has aroused anxiety is to be found in the past or in the future. Primarily of course this mode of reaction serves the purpose of mastering an unpleasurable impression. But the recollection of the past experience must at once awaken fears of its repetition. Thus the form of reaction in question is Janus-headed, one face looking towards the past and the other to the future. Closer examination, however, reveals that each of the two faces is possessed of certain distinctive features. The process of transformation which takes place in connection with an anxiety-experience of the past is a special instance of the ego's efforts in the realm of the psyche to achieve the mastery over an unduly powerful or sudden stimulus. Identification with an aggressor (or with one who one fears may become an aggressor) is a special instance of *identification for the purpose of mastering anxiety*. This process can also take place in regard to inanimate objects. A small boy who has seen and been terrified by a railway engine may very well later on his return home play that he himself is the engine which rushes past with a deafening roar.

It would be tempting to correlate the violence of the aggression which, regarded psychologically, is a reactive one, with the strength of the assailing stimulus. But it would be a mistake to do so, because ther we should fail to do justice to the subject whose anxiety is stimulated. The strength of the ego has to be considered in each case. We shall therefore follow Anna Freud and decide in favour of correlating the violence of the aggression with the intensity of the fear giving rise to it. I propose to call the specific mode of reaction which arises here *aggression from anxiety*. I may say at once that this reaction is not confined to the individual. Aggression from anxiety also plays a part in the lives of nations and other communities.

The other face of this Janus-headed reaction is turned forward to an event which has still to take place. Here the aggression is brought about by fear of an attack or a punishment. This state of anxious expectation would be impossible if it did not go back to an unconscious memory or (more correctly) memory-trace. The family resemblance

of our Janus face becomes more marked at this point and we perceive that it has two parts—an older and a more recent one.

This identification with the future aggressor has one specific mental determinant. It would be inconceivable but for the operation of a mechanism of forestalling. In a book (2) first published in 1935 I tried to explain how this mechanism works. Identification with the future aggressor is a reaction to his expected anxiety-arousing attitude.

It is with no thought of claiming a priority, which could not in any case be justified, but in order to demonstrate the similarity of the results achieved by psychological observation that I refer to a study of mine (3) published in 1929, parts of which are concerned with the genesis of aggression from anxiety. I there stated that it was in conformity with the principle of retrogression of affect that fear of an object, once it had reached a certain height, should be transformed into aggression. And I went on to say that this mechanism was not confined to human beings. Dogs would frequently attack people because they were afraid of them, and they would stop being aggressive when they were made to feel that they had nothing to fear. ' The impressions we derive from our analyses of neurotics may help us to a dawning realization that we have hitherto underestimated the significance of this mechanism whereby anxiety is transformed into hatred and so into aggressive tendencies. In the course of psycho-analytical practice one meets with experiences which point to the conclusion that sudden actions of an aggressive or hostile character are often the result of an attempt to ward off excessive anxiety. Such impulsive actions are not confined to hysteria ; the symptomatology of the obsessional neurosis provides us with numerous examples of this specific type of defence against anxiety in the form of instinctual irruptions. And this is even more true of manic-depressive conditions. I think it likely that here we find ourselves on the track of a psychological explanation of aggression in the psychoses. In them, an attempt is made to deal with the threat which proceeds (or seems to proceed) from an object, by threatening that object. More important still is the investigation of this defensive mechanism and this process of transformation for the psychology of the criminal. Criminal psychologists, judges and criminal lawyers would be well advised to study these difficult processes with the help of the psycho-analytical method. A great many otherwise inexplicable crimes become intelligible in the light of that psychical process whereby aggression is employed as a means of reducing the tension caused by anxiety.'

In this passage we find an early attempt to formulate aggression from anxiety in psychological terms. Anna Freud has enlarged my view that an act of aggression on an object is designed to overcome fear of that object, by adding the more valuable piece of knowledge concerning the process of identification with the aggressor. Her theory also explains how, with the assistance of a projection of guilt, identification with the aggressor develops into aggressive action against the external world. She brings forward some good examples from the mental life of children and adults to demonstrate this process of defence. Thus we have instances of boys identifying themselves with the threats of some person in authority ; in other words, criticism of the child's conduct on the part of the external world has been internalized. An adult woman patient, after introjecting a phantasied reproach, proceeds to direct the same reproach against her analyst ; and in this way the verdict of the outer world is forestalled and made to recoil upon it. By introjecting the authorities to whose criticism it is exposed, the ego is able to project its prohibited impulses outwards and then to condemn them. When an ego develops along this line, ' its intolerance of other people is prior to its severity towards itself. It learns what is regarded as blameworthy but protects itself by means of this defence-mechanism from unpleasant self-criticism. Vehement indignation at someone else's wrongdoing is the precursor of and substitute for guilty feelings on its own account.'

In partial confirmation of the assumption contained in these sentences and at the same time with a view to further discussion, I might mention that I arrived at a similar conclusion in considering the unconscious need for punishment. In my book on that subject (4) I called attention to that not uncommon reaction in which the subject behaves aggressively towards the very persons he has wronged. He ' avenges himself on one whom he has hurt or injured for the injury he has inflicted, which would be a truly ridiculous proposition but for the validity in these cases of two assumptions of a psychological nature.' These assumptions are the great intensity of the unconscious need for punishment and the psychological factor of unconscious identification. This peculiar form of mental reaction is illustrated by reference to Dostoevsky's portrayal of Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov. He sought to take revenge on all the world for the infamy of his ways. And he remembered how he had once been asked : ' Why do you hate this man so much ? ' and how in one of his fits of shameless buffoonery he had replied : ' Why ? I'll tell you : he's done me no harm, true

enough ; but I played him a rotten trick and no sooner had I done so than I began to hate him for that very reason.' The psychological attitude depicted here may very well be compared with the examples adduced by Anna Freud.

In connection with this part of Anna Freud's theory, I do not think it is right to say that an ego of this kind is intolerant of other people before it is severe towards itself and that we have here an intermediate stage in the development of the super-ego which at the same time represents some kind of preliminary phase of morality. On the contrary I am of opinion that the subject's perception of his own guilt has in these cases assumed such an exceptionally severe and acute form that he must drive his aggressiveness outwards if his ego is to remain intact. I hold that we are here confronted not with a defective development of the super-ego, but with a hypertrophied activity on its part —with a development which is excessive at any rate in relation to an ego that is still weak and unconfident of itself. If the ego, finding itself in this situation, were not to seek relief by such a method of unburdenment, the sense of guilt, now become too powerful to bear, would turn against the ego and the result would be, not a greater awareness of guilt (which indeed is often perceived consciously) but an attack of melancholia. The turning of aggressiveness back on to the outside world must be regarded, in my view, as an attempt at cure, the aim of which is to ward off the unduly powerful reproaches of the super-ego by ' a repetition of the crime '. Therapy in these cases of ego-disorder could not possibly consist in trying to make guilt conscious or promoting the development of the super-ego. It should rather be directed to weakening the patient's self-reproaches and strengthening his ego. It will make him see that unconsciously he overestimates the extent of his culpability, that others take a less serious view of it than he does himself ; so that his aggression against the external world, from which he fears a similar aggression against himself, is not so dangerous and may perhaps never happen at all. To put it in simpler language, we must persuade him that there is no need for him to hit out so wildly because he is not going to get any very hard knocks ; and that whatever he may have done (or thought) is not some frightful crime but the outcome of a specific psychical situation. An apparent objection to this view of the matter might be found in the fact that the reaction we have described is, in fact, accompanied by an aggressiveness which is incompatible with a normal development of the super-ego and is intended to injure the outside world. Against that it may be

said that the ego by acting in this way ultimately does far more harm to itself than to anyone else, so that this result alone entitles us to infer the existence of an undue sense of guilt. But it is precisely the intensity of this reaction which is proof of a hypertrophied development of the super-ego relatively to the ego. It is true that—in conformity with the process which I have called the law of retrogression to the original affect —the aggression reappears, perceived as guilt, but that is a sign that the sense of guilt has increased rather than diminished. When we heat a saucepan in order to cook food, the water overflows not because it is not hot enough but because it is too hot, because it is boiling. That is certainly not a purposeful reaction and, in overflowing, the boiling water may well injure someone standing near.

There are two points of difference between the view held by Anna Freud and the one sustained here ; they result from a divergence of opinion upon the part played by the super-ego in the cases referred to, and in connection with the question of value. As regards the first point, I am of opinion not that we are here dealing with a preliminary phase of super-ego development but rather that the ego has not been able to keep pace with this development, that its strength is unequal to that of the super-ego. The development of the super-ego is not too feeble but too powerful in relation to the ego and to the subject's self-feeling. But the important point is the relation between the two. The difference of outlook as regards the question of value is best revealed, I think, by the remark which Anna Freud proceeds to make after evaluating the ego-situation in question as a preliminary phase of morality. She says that true morality begins when the internalized criticism, appearing within the realm of the ego as a standard exacted by the super-ego, coincides with the subject's perception of his own fault. As I have already remarked elsewhere I feel extremely sceptical over the idea of a ' true ' morality as opposed to one that is unreal or apparent. Who would feel entitled to decide where this pseudo-morality leaves off and true morality begins ? It seems to me not only more in accordance with the facts of the case but also more helpful to approach the problem from the standpoint of psychic economics rather than to introduce an arbitrary standard of value of this kind. But from an economic point of view it may be asserted that the kind of aggression that arises from a subjective perception of guilt is derived from an excess of guilty feeling, which is solely determined by the relative weakness of the ego in relation to the super-ego (originally the outer world). Therapy in these cases must therefore aim at inducing the patient to demand less

of himself and to hope for more. (In this simultaneous reduction of super-ego demands and strengthening of confidence in the ego we shall recognize one of the most important tasks which pedagogy will have to fulfil in the future.)

The ego-situation which we have described becomes more intelligible if we follow Freud's example and substitute the words ' social anxiety ' for ' sense of guilt '. The vehemence of the aggression is commensurate with the intensity of the social anxiety experienced, but this anxiety is too great in relation to the transgression that is contemplated. The object, if the ' crime ' came to its knowledge, would not visit the ego with the dire punishment it dreads.

It only remains for me to point out quite briefly that in a number of cases a remnant of the old anxiety can easily be recognized before or even during an act of aggression from anxiety. In one such case, that of a young man who was by profession a criminal lawyer, I was able to observe this both in his behaviour in the courts and in the analytic transference. His bearing towards the judge in cases in which he had to defend a criminal was at first anxious and submissive but rapidly became transformed into an aggressive one. It was easy to see how very closely he identified himself in his capacity as counsel for the defence with the accused. There was something challenging about the way he attacked the presiding judge, that still betrayed in its specific form the continued existence of an anxiety which had apparently been completely surmounted. In other cases of aggression from anxiety there is a certain quality of insolence which is to be regarded as a derivative of a persisting and operative anxiety. Sometimes the anxiety continues to exist—at least in part—in spite of the violence of the aggression. In these cases the person who attacks from anxiety is as it were still fearful of his own courage. Threats must be regarded as a weakened form of aggression from anxiety ; and one might well speak of a ' threat from anxiety '. An even more attenuated and socially adapted form of aggression from anxiety is seen when this is replaced by the wish to create an impression.

Perhaps I may be allowed to carry this discussion of the theory of aggression from anxiety a stage further. As Anna Freud has well shown, identification with an aggressor has the important function to fulfil of avoiding anxiety. Nevertheless two facts militate against the assumption that the avoidance of anxiety can be the primary motive of that reaction. The first of these facts is the exaggerated nature and frenzied vehemence of the attack which is characteristically

sudden and explosive in quality. It would not bear these features if the motive were simply to avoid anxiety, even assuming the anxiety to be acute. The second fact is derived from an observation made on a child and may perhaps shed some further light on the subject. I was watching a little boy who had hidden himself and who, with a cry which was meant to be terrifying, suddenly rushed out of his hiding-place and fell upon his playmates. I knew that the boy's elder brother was fond of frightening him suddenly in a dark passage in their home. The little boy had identified himself with his assailant, whose part he now played in relation to his friends. But his attack on them was intended to inspire fright rather than anxiety. We must assume that the original affect against which he was trying to defend himself was fright.

I must, I fear, once again refer to a theory of my own. According to this it is not anxiety but the primary and much more violent affect of fright which underlies most of the defensive measures taken by the ego. Anxiety, I maintain, is a secondary reaction, at once a repetition of the affect of fright in a milder form and a safeguard against its repetition. To appreciate its function we might compare it with an injection of bacilli given as a prophylactic measure in order to diminish the virulence of an infection.

Anxiety is a defensive reaction to something that threatens to break through; fright is the reaction to something that is actually breaking through (2). Thus anxiety may be regarded as a buffer or safeguard adopted by the ego to ward off fright. To experience anxiety is to forestall in imagination the frightening event and thus to protect the ego against the catastrophic effects of that event.

Aggression based on identification with an aggressor is originally a response evoked not by an anxiety-situation but by a danger-situation. Later of course it comes to be employed secondarily as a defence against anxiety. But its primary object is to ward off the more sudden and violent affect of fright which threatens to overwhelm the ego. If we accept this genetic view of the matter there is nothing to prevent our speaking of aggression from anxiety in the cases mentioned. I might add that aggression from anxiety can also be directed towards purely imaginary beings, if these are believed to constitute a menace to the subject (as in the psychoses). When Luther hurled the inkstand at the devil he was trying to overcome his fear of him in the same way. If, psychologically considered, aggression from anxiety is seen to be an active variant and substitute for an anxiety-attack, it is perhaps

worth recalling that the word 'attack' (like the French '*attaque*') is used both in an active and in a passive sense.

This is also the proper place for me to expand the theory I have put forward by showing how I picture the psychogenetic development of anxiety from fright. The affect of fright, the earliest and most powerful affect in young animals and children alike, leaves deeply-buried memory-traces (not memories) in the ego. Any external situation which seems to offer a suitable opportunity for re-animating those memory traces, just grazing their surface one might say, ultimately leads to a repetition of the affect of fright which, however, gradually declines in strength as it becomes inured to the stimulus. We may proceed to define this re-animation of a memory trace as ideational fright, that is to say as a reaction of fright to the emergence of a frightening idea. I consider it likely that fright succeeds in being transformed into anxiety when the idea of the frightening thing has appeared in the ego a sufficient number of times. A reduction in intensity of affect from fright to anxiety would accordingly come from having successfully gone through this ideational fright on many occasions and would be the result of a better adaptation to the constantly recurring frightening images. It is to be assumed that those ideas originally possessed the character of hallucinations and had a correspondingly strong affective influence. A comparison that comes naturally to the mind may make the point clearer. The hero in Schiller's Ballad 'The Fight with the Dragon' trains his two fine mastiffs by leading them again and again to a lifelike representation of the monster. Their first reaction will assuredly have been one of violent fright. But the knight drives them over and over again before the loathsome object:

> 'At first my snorting charger rear'd
> And started when the foe he neared.
> My savage dogs, too, shrunk in terror,
> But soon I trained them from their error.'
>
> (*J. P. Collier's Translation*)

Just as the two dogs pass from fright to anxiety and finally learn to surmount that too, so familiarity succeeds in diluting the primary affect of fright in the small child to one of anxiety.

I have already said that it has been no part of my purpose in this paper, which is concerned only with a single chapter of Anna Freud's book and even then with some only of the ideas and associations to be found in it, to attempt an appreciation of the work itself. If, however,

I should have indirectly given rise to that impression, that can only be because no psychologist can fail to find a careful study of the book both stimulating and fruitful.

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ON INTROJECTION AND THE PROCESSES OF PSYCHIC METABOLISM [1]

BY

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LONDON

It is now twenty-three years since Sigmund Freud brought into the arena of psycho-analysis a concept which he then used for explaining certain processes in mourning and melancholia. Some time earlier Ferenczi had christened it, and, since Freud's paper, the term ' introjection ' has been ever present in the various phases of development of our science. The first notions given to us by him received an important development and enlargement thanks to the work of Abraham, who linked up introjection with the period of oral development of the libido. His disciple, Melanie Klein, continued his work and, here again, developed it along certain lines. Thanks to her work we have been able to gain more insight into what are now called ' introjected objects ', into the various handlings to which the individual submits those objects in the course of his emotional alternations, and we have been presented with a vivid account of the devastating effects of hate in destroying them, tearing them to pieces, blowing them up, etc., and of the painful work of love in its attempt to counteract such effects by restoring them to their original state, isolating them or keeping them apart from dangers.

Many of the familiar terms of old, which were almost the ' pets ' of the psycho-analysts of previous decades, have been relegated to the past, almost forgotten, in order to give way to this word ' introjection ', which nowadays has an almost magic halo around it. Many of Melanie Klein's theories and suggestions have met with strong opposition, and I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that as soon as the subject is mentioned we find analysts speedily gathering into opposing and apparently irreconcilable groups—one which accepts absolutely all her contributions, and the other formed by those who feel inclined to sift in a more critical manner both the clinical material offered by the first group and the conceptions underlying their presentation.

Those belonging to the first group accuse the others—more or less implicitly, more or less explicitly—of not being able to accept their theories on account of emotional difficulties. Those who would fall

[1] Read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, June 19, 1940.

into the second group, on the other hand, cannot help seeing in their opponents a very intransigent attitude, almost reminiscent of religious fanaticism. Without entering into a discussion of whether the attitude of the second group is caused by that of the first, I should like here to make a reflection. I do not believe that it is by chance that the subject is so continuously and recurrently brought into our arguments ; had it been unimportant, I should have thought that, whatever differences of opinion there might be, these would not have been a sufficient cause for the intensity of the ardour. I believe, rather, that we are all inclined to take more or less violent sides, because we all feel, perhaps to an extent much greater than we know, that the subject *is* of great importance ; if properly handled, it might bring to psycho-analysis an abundant harvest of knowledge. Yet, in my opinion, after the first magistral strides with which Freud led the way, pointing his finger in the right direction, and after the development by Abraham and Klein, we seem to have come lately (by lately I mean during the last few years) to a point at which we are stuck. Attempts at further development are continually made by Melanie Klein and her followers, but the result seems to be nothing more than, to use a graphic French expression, '*piétiner sur place*', moving incessantly without ever succeeding in going forward.

Before entering into the subject, I feel that I must account for what might be thought my audacity in broaching it, considering that I am a comparative newcomer in psycho-analytical circles. There has been endless discussion in this Society ; some people have put forward certain ideas and some others have criticized them ; clinical material has been presented to prove or illustrate the theories brought forward, and again rejected on various grounds by the opposing party, yet to my knowledge there has been no systematic revision of the general formulation of the points on which people agree, or of those on which they disagree. In view of this, and after some hesitation, I have thought of bringing forward for consideration the result of my observations and reflections upon some clinical cases, which I believe may be useful as a basis for discussion. I must hasten to add that I do not intend here to make a systematic revision of this vast subject ; I shall, on the contrary, concentrate particularly on one or two aspects of it.

To return to Freud's fundamental paper on ' Mourning and Melancholia '—I should think everyone would agree when I say that it was this paper that brought to the fore, to the fullest extent, the subject of introjection. Yet it is surprising to find that the word itself is not once

even mentioned in the paper. After reading it over and over again, there are certain things about it which have struck me and which, had they been more frequently kept present to our minds, would have spared us certain unwelcome developments.

First of all he is extremely modest in his claims and warns us that he is not attempting to draw any general conclusion. He warns us that melancholia is not a unity and that under this heading many types are to be found, some of them having as their fundamental origin a somatic disturbance. This, of course, is very well known to all psychiatrists, not only as regards melancholia but as regards the less intense depressions, such as post-infective depressions. When he refers to the introjection of the person who is the object of the emotions, he does not speak so much of introjection *in toto ;* rather, he is always referring to a series of attachments : ' Each single one of the memories and hopes that bound the libido to the object ', he writes, ' is brought up and hyper-cathected, and the detachment of the libido from it accomplished.'

This looks like the description of the reversal of a process and suggests that the libidinal attachment to the person in question was formed gradually, bit by bit, to-day in this respect or incident, to-morrow in that one, and later in another. Although Freud does not enlarge upon this point, I think it is worth while making a few remarks on it. The idea we form of any given person is not a wholesale one, if I may be allowed to use such an expression, but is the result of a series of partial impressions over a succession of time ; exactly the same can be said of our emotional attachment. No matter how objective one may be, the mental image of an external object can never be a true reflection of that object, for the simple reason that our knowledge of it can never be exhausted. Thus, the image that a child of five, for example, has of his father, who is, let us suppose, a great mathematician, will be quite different from that of one of his father's University colleagues, even supposing that the idea of the great mathematician has been formed by the child as a result of objective observation on his part. For the child, his Daddy might be a big body, a mass of hair, an accumulation of niceness or of sternness and severity, a few mannerisms, a certain way of expressing himself, in addition to his liking for certain kinds of food, special ways of sitting, walking and moving in general, characteristic attitudes regarding the child himself or regarding his mother and other persons of the near environment, and so on and so forth. But no matter how great a mathematician the father may be,

for the child of five this quality, *per se*, does not mean very much, unless it is reflected somehow in his father's relationship with him. On the other hand, the emotional attachments the child forms to him will be conditioned by his impressions and will be related to each single one of these impressions. Thus he may like his smile, the way he has treated him on various occasions, and these likes and dislikes will spread to other characteristics which in themselves do not particularly arouse emotional reactions, by a mechanism similar to that of a conditioned reflex. Thus his hair, his walk, etc., may become an object of emotion. When a child introjects his father, even when he makes what is now called an introjection of a whole object, he cannot introject the whole father, the whole image, but only a succession of impressions and the corresponding feelings, perhaps objective, perhaps strongly coloured by the child's emotional make-up, but in any case a succession of impressions and feelings about him, the totality of which represents in the child's mind the image of the father. What makes it a total introjection is the fact that these partial impressions and attachments are now simultaneously introjected.

In the analytical work subsequent to Freud's paper I have the impression that the notion ' introjection of a whole object ' has become, as it were, stereotyped ; it has become a coined term, something like a mathematical sign which, for the purposes of our ordinary work has a certain definite meaning and of which we do not think any more. Thus, when we manipulate algebraic formulæ in the elucidation of a given problem, we do not trouble to think much about their meaning —we just use them, confident that they are right and certain that at any moment we can go back and understand exactly what they express. The same thing, unfortunately, has happened with the term ' introjection ', and so we see that Melanie Klein—and I hesitate to criticize her for this, as up to a point it was natural that she should do so—has throughout her writing dropped the careful wording used by Freud in the paper referred to, to employ only, or principally, the sign for the concept without stopping any longer to think of its implications, or the world of complexities underlying it. The term ' introjection ' is now used, as it were, like money ; we pass it on, sometimes we divide it, as for instance, when the introjected object is destroyed, then we add it up, but never do we stop to think what it stands for. In the same way, when we change a one pound note into a ten shilling note and a few silver coins, we never stop to think of the Bank of England, of its store of gold and of what the gold stands for

—material goods, means of production, basic wealth, etc.—no, we do not think about it, we just change the money and spend it.

I believe that it is this employment of the sign representing a concept—' introjection '—and its corresponding derivative, ' introjected object,' which has caused a certain number of developments in the Melanie Klein school, reminiscent of the casuistry of the Middle Ages. The introjected object has become something so concrete, so well delimited or sharply defined, that when one hears of people introjecting either the whole or part object, and then projecting it on to the outside world, introjecting it again, cutting it to pieces, blowing it up, putting the pieces together again—when one hears all this one cannot help recalling the animistic conceptions of children and primitive people. I know perfectly well that there are some who would argue immediately : but this is precisely what psycho-analysis has revealed, the primitive and the child in every human being. In reply to this, I do not for a moment doubt that all the phantasies described by Melanie Klein and her followers in their various writings and conversations correspond to a certain kind of psychic reality. As Melitta Schmideberg remarked in one of our discussions, it is sufficient for a phantasy, however gruesome, to be described for it to exist, because even if it did not exist in the mind of the patient it would at least exist in the mind of the analyst who is supposed to have found it. I have no doubt that the phantasies of introjection described are true, not only because they were at least thought of by the analyst, but also because in my opinion they hold true of the patient's mind likewise. But in this respect we must make a few remarks. Firstly, it is very important to distinguish between a phantasy and a mechanism ; a symptom or a process in a patient may be described in terms of a phantasy, but this is not sufficient to allow the analyst to conclude that the mechanism underlying the phantasy is the one openly expressed in it. I believe that, because we have not kept sufficiently constantly in our minds the meaning of the processes of introjection, we have classified many of these phantasies under the heading of mechanisms, and perhaps with a little imagination indulged in the development of them. In this respect much of the material which has been interpreted in terms of introjection could easily be interpreted in terms of other mechanisms.

Melanie Klein's 1935 paper on the ' Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States ' is based on the material gathered from ' the analysis of depressive states in cases of severe neuroses, border-line

cases and in patients, both adults and children, who displayed mixed paranoiac and depressive trends'. Now, judging from what this quotation suggests, I am inclined to think that these cases represent persons gravely ill; but an unmistakable attempt has been made to apply the conclusions drawn from this material to all human beings, and thus we find nowadays a group of analysts eagerly seeking for the same kind of phantasy as those described by Melanie Klein in every patient they treat. From my personal experience, which naturally is not very vast, but which is, nevertheless, sufficient to enable me to form at least a tentative opinion, I can say that in a few severe cases I have been able to confirm almost everything that Melanie Klein has written regarding the processes of introjection. The most striking example I have seen is one furnished by a case of an alcoholic, which I reported some years ago to this Society. It was evident in that case that the patient felt actually within himself the various objects of his ambivalent desires; he did attempt to control the dangerous ones and to preserve the good ones; he did feel a murderer within himself, etc., etc. In this case the term 'introjected object' and all the processes described concerning it had a very real meaning, and I have no doubt that there were moments when no other interpretations could be made than those of such a type.

In other patients I have also been able to find similar processes in certain periods of analysis; all the cases in which the processes of introjection as described by Melanie Klein have been apparent to me have been cases of individuals suffering from very extreme anxieties. I feel firmly convinced that when we attempt to apply these findings indiscriminately to the cases of more normal individuals we only fall into the error of mere juggling with words. Of course, much of the material with which the patient furnishes us can be interpreted in those terms, but it can very well be interpreted in other terms also. As a consequence of this continuous insistence, a new conception of the mind has been evolved, according to which every individual is a real pot-pourri of objects inside him, a conception which mishandles very badly one of the most fundamental postulates of biology, namely, the unity of every living being in regard to the environment. By their never-faltering persistence in their search for introjected objects the analysts belonging to the Melanie Klein school have come to an *impasse* of unrealistic thinking, from which they cannot escape unless they modify their conceptions. While I agree with them in their attempts to stress the importance of the process of introjection, I find

that the trouble is, as I have said, that they have not cared to develop our knowledge of the concept of introjection, but have only occupied themselves with multiplying with innumerable examples all the possibilities which may happen to the introjected object.

If one reads what has been written in the last few years by members of this school, and what has been said in various papers read before this Society, one is struck by the fact that the introjected object is always described as something apart from the person, something which may play a very important rôle in the individual's life and even direct it, which may be a precipitating point for the person's affections, but which nevertheless remains apart from the individual, no matter how much inside the ego it may be. The result of this is that the introjected object, in the way it is thus described, gives the impression of a foreign body and hence the corresponding rigidity and immobility of the various psychic processes relating to it.

In certain cases of melancholia that is quite in agreement with the general impression produced by the patients; there is in them a certain slowness of thought, a difficulty in changing, and altogether a certain mental rigidity. These people do behave in fact as though they had a foreign body within themselves and were trying to deal with it in one way or another. This is probably so, to a smaller extent, in some cases of less grave depression. From the conception of the introjected object suggested by these severe cases, Melanie Klein's school—but I should like to explain here why I always refer to ' Melanie Klein's school ' and not to Melanie Klein alone. The reason is that the papers Melanie Klein has published refer to manic-depressive states and, recently, to cases of mourning; but, from what she has expressed in various discussions in this Society, I have every reason to suppose that she agrees with the extension of these concepts usually made by her followers to other types of nervous disturbances or to the normal individual. Indeed I should imagine that it is she who was the first to start this extension. Melanie Klein's school, then, as I was saying, has extended or applied these notions to every human being. It is obvious that normal individuals, and many cases of neurosis, do not share the rigidity and immobility characteristic of severe depressive cases, and it seems to me that in order to obviate the difficulty this group of analysts has devised the method of multiplying the number of processes that can happen to the introjected object. We hear of very quick alternations between introjection and projection, that certainly give at least a mask of immobility; we hear also of the

various processes of cutting up, and other forms of destruction to which the introjected object is submitted. I do not think that any of these multiplications of immobility will solve the problem, and create dynamism from what is static in itself. The introjected object, no matter how much divided into small pieces, no matter how many pilgrimages it makes from inside to outside and *vice versâ*, will always remain what these conceptions suggest—something immobile, something outside the psyche of the individual, foreign to it, whose ultimate fate can be none other than expulsion. Such is the law of biology; we are accustomed to see the gigantic efforts of the body to protect itself from foreign invasion, and the study of anaphylaxis has shown us how sensitive living matter is to the presence of the smallest extraneous particle. As regards the mind, everything points towards the existence of a similar law.

I repeat here again that I do not intend to deny the various processes described. I believe that these do happen in certain cases. I am only attempting to show that the inferences drawn from the observation of some cases, which have been implicitly, if not very often explicitly, erected into general principles governing the functioning of the human mind, do not always hold true, because the procedure employed is not a truly scientific one. A pathological process has thus been erected into a normal one, while the proper course would have been to investigate what the normal process is that has gone wrong in the case observed, to infer the normal from the pathological. It is in this respect, it seems to me, that the Melanie Klein school shows its greatest weakness.

I do not want this paper to be merely destructive, however, and I am therefore putting forward some suggestions of a more positive nature. If we look back upon the history of introjection, since Freud wrote his paper in 1917, we may see that the next important step is represented by Abraham's ' Study of the Development of the Libido '. In it we find the germ of the developments added by Melanie Klein, and also perhaps the source of their distortions. This is not the moment to emphasize his important contributions to the subject, regarding the rôle of cannibalism in the processes of introjection and the correlation between those processes and the development of the libido. So far as I am aware, Abraham was in this line of thought the first who (I should imagine for the sake of greater convenience) began to use the term ' introjection ', referring to the process more or less as a whole. This is not very clearly marked in his paper, but nevertheless one

detects in this respect a certain difference from Freud, who spoke of the gradual detachment of the libido.

Later on it was only sufficient to accentuate this attitude to lead to a conception of introjection almost as a material process of putting inside the ego well delimited physical objects which were foreign to it. But at the same time we find in Abraham some very interesting suggestions which open up new vistas for further development and, had they been followed, some of the developments of to-day would probably have been avoided. I shall now quote from the paper mentioned :

' Up till now we have been examining the process of introjection and some of its effects, and we may shortly sum up our conclusions as follows : When melancholic persons suffer an unbearable disappointment from their love-object they tend to expel that object as though it were fæces and to destroy it. They thereupon accomplish the act of introjecting and devouring it—an act which is a specifically melancholic form of narcissistic identification. Their sadistic thirst for vengeance now finds its satisfaction in tormenting the ego—an activity which is in part pleasurable. We have reason to suppose that that period of self-torment lasts until lapse of time and the gradual appeasement of sadistic desires have removed the love-object from the danger of being destroyed. When this has happened the object can, as it were, come out of its hiding-place in the ego. The melancholiac can restore it to its place in the outer world. It seems to me to be of no little psychological interest to be able to establish the fact that in his unconscious the melancholiac regards this liberation from his object as once more an act of evacuation. During the time when his depression was clearly beginning to diminish, one of my cases had a dream in which he expelled with the greatest sensation of relief a stopper that was sticking in his anus. This act of expulsion concludes the process of that archaic form of mourning which we must consider melancholia to be. We may truly say that during the course of an attack of melancholia the love-object goes through a process of psychological metabolism within the patient.'

This quotation strongly suggests that Abraham regarded melancholia first as having certain processes which are specific—those of cannibalistically devouring the object, which were followed by a series of events ending in the final expulsion of the object. Judging from his description, it looks as though he had the idea that melancholia was a kind of mental indigestion. Now, from our knowledge of

pathology, we know that abnormal processes are always the disturbances of normal functions and in this case we find ourselves asking: What then is the normal function that is disturbed in melancholia? Innumerable little observations on my patients and reflections upon various forms of human activity have led me to think that, following the suggestions of Abraham, the human mind is in a perpetual state of exchange with its environment, just as the human body is in a perpetual state of metabolism, taking from outside, digesting, expelling what is not necessary and integrating the products of digestion into its own tissues.

From my experience of cases in which I have been able to establish very clearly the existence of introjected objects, I can say that with the progress of analysis and with the gradual improvement in the patient, the introjected object gradually faded, as it were, or fused more and more into the patient's ego. I am not going to give particulars of cases, firstly because, if we were to gain anything, it would entail entering into them in great detail; and secondly because even then I do not think that I could bring forward convincing proofs in the course of a short paper. In my opinion the discussion of clinical material is only fruitful when a few analysts get together to follow the treatment of a patient in the most minute detail, session by session. If this is not done, experience shows that the proofs are not convincing, as we have noted over and over again at the meetings of this Society.

As I was saying, with the progress of the treatment and the gradual improvement of the patient, I have seen in several cases the gradual disappearance of the introjected object as something which is felt apart from the patient's ego, as a foreign body which is loved or hated, protected, attacked, etc. Some time ago Paula Heimann related a similar experience in one of her cases. ' All these anxieties related to bad and good internal objects ', she wrote, ' and interference with the subject's internal freedom are bound to arise when internalized parents are felt like foreign bodies embedded in the self. I think that the independence which is an important factor in successful sublimation and projected activity is achieved through a process which I like to call the " assimilation " of the internal objects by which the subject acquires and absorbs those qualities of his internal parents which are suitable and adequate to him. This process presupposes a diminution of aggression (greed) and anxiety and thus a breaking up of the vicious circle.' From a certain aspect one can say that the internal object gradually melts into the ego. I do not know how far she would agree

with me, however, in what I am about to say. The process of assimilation which she has so aptly described is carried, in my opinion, to an extent which involves the actual disappearance of what has been called the internal object, and perhaps in this respect we could now make some remarks regarding the meaning of our finding these internal objects in certain cases.

It would appear to me that, in the course of the perpetual exchange between himself and the environment, the normal individual takes from the environment, absorbs into himself, the parental and other images and submits them to a process which finally results in their division into their various components. I must explain what I mean by this: I have spoken of the child's total image of a parent and the corresponding emotional attitude elicited, as being composed of a series of small impressions (to each one of which corresponds an emotional reaction) regarding various characteristics of that parent; the addition of all these impressions gives the image of the parent, just as the addition of the corresponding emotional reactions gives the total emotional attitude. When, for instance, a child is being subjected to the violent frustration of the absence of his mother, he can deal with it by means of an imaginary putting of the mother inside himself and thus having her, as it were, handy in order to provide for all his needs. Thus the child will imagine that inside him there is a mother who may give him milk, caress him, protect him against cold, reassure him against fear, smile, etc., etc.—in short, a mother who performs a series of functions which the child has previously experienced separately and isolatedly in the various details of his relationship with her.

The total image of the introjected mother would be composed, for instance, of the mother who actually smiled at the child at a certain moment, the mother who smiled on another occasion, on a succession of occasions, the mother who actually gave milk to the child, each experience of feeding being apart from the others, but fusing together into a whole; the mother who actually protected him many times against cold, who actually caressed him on repeated occasions, etc., etc. Of course, there will also be the mother who frustrated him in various ways and in this way aroused hate, and hence ambivalence, as each one of the various other actions of the mother had previously aroused the corresponding love reactions. Now, when a total introjection is effected we find that these previously experienced emotional reactions are evoked again. It may happen that the fear resulting from ambi-

valence leads to expulsion and thus the need arises for a subsequent introjection ; this cycle may be repeated over and over again. In the midst of these changes we see a purpose common to all the series of more or less rapidly alternating introjections and projections, namely, the attempts of the child to maintain or re-establish the constancy of an environment which was in danger of changing or had changed—in the example mentioned, on account of the mother's having gone away. In this way internalizing serves the purpose of stabilizing the external environment by establishing what I have called in another paper the ' psychical *milieu intérieur* ', which will enable the child to tolerate more easily the variations of the external environment and, in consequence, the frustrations imposed upon him by those variations.

But once the mother, or any other figure, is internalized, the process does not stop there ; when we say that the child needs a mother we are only expressing the fact that the child needs to be fed at certain times in certain ways, needs to be clothed, protected against external injury, to be loved, and loved in various forms—so that we are really saying that the child requires provision for all the various needs connected with his maintenance and development. Once the image is internalized it is up to it to perform, at least for the time being, this series of functions, or the one needed at the moment. In order to do so, the total image must be split into the images corresponding to each single one of these needs, and in this respect we can say that the internalized object is subjected to a process of catabolism, which will release the various component elements that will satisfy the corresponding needs.

This total internalization is a process which seems to happen frequently in the child at a certain period, but which always marks a situation of extreme urgency and consequently of extreme anxiety. Parallel with it there is all the time another process going on, which could be described as the separate absorption or introjection of one or many of the partial images of the mother, the innumerable images which represent her as the provider of each one of the innumerable needs of the child.

I am not speaking here of the introjection of part objects, breast or penis, but of separate introjection of one of the qualities of the mother. A child in need of a caress, for instance, at a moment when the mother is not giving it, may introject the image of a caressing mother, in itself already the composite resultant of the numerous experiences of being caressed ; this image (and I think this is very

important) will not be the image of the total mother (in fact, from a certain aspect we could even say that it will not be an image at all) but just the re-creation of the state aroused in him when he was being caressed. This re-creation comprises, of course, not only the child's sensations, but the emotions of love, pleasure, etc., provoked by them, and also some sort of more or less vague conception of the person arousing them. We come here to a problem which may seem extremely obscure, but which I believe is of great importance for us to study and clarify. We touch here the limit between sensation on the one side and image and emotions on the other, between body and mind. It is a limit which remains for us wrapped in mystery. We know from analytical literature that the actual introjection of total images sometimes brings about far-reaching changes, even of a physical nature. We hear from Abraham that after the death of his father his hair turned white, thus acquiring one of his father's characteristics ; after the period of mourning has passed, the natural colour returned. In this instance we find ourselves before a very puzzling problem, which might perhaps lead us to entirely new fields if we could only understand it. A mental process of incorporation of the father led not only to the acquisition of his mental qualities but also to a physical change of a very subtle nature, which is far beyond the mental control of the body, as we know it at present ; it looks as though the introjection of the parent had really some characteristics of a physical impact, which remained active only as long as the process of introjection was maintained. In a way we can say that the introjected object spread inside the body and permeated it, superimposing itself upon it, if I may use a crude comparison, head upon head, hand upon hand, foot upon foot.

Yet what actually is an introjection ? According to Freud's definition it would be the withdrawal of the libido from the external object and the placing of it on to a certain part of the ego, which would in this way represent the object. This would be from the emotional point of view, but would also result, from the image point of view, in the assuming by that part of the ego of some of the qualities of the external object. According to Freud, after this happening, the liberation of the libido is effected by a gradual withdrawal of it from each one of the memories which constitute its attachment to the object. Putting the same thing in other words, the object is submitted in the ego to a gradual splitting up into all its various components.

Up to now I have been dealing with introjection of total objects

which are subsequently split up into their various components. There is another kind of introjection which is not usually referred to and which is probably of far greater importance for the normal life of the individual. Just as the child performs the mental process of introjecting the breast in order to supply his needs when the breast is not present, there is also a mental process which can be related to the actual absorption of milk. Physically the child never actually eats the breast, but only absorbs the milk, and I believe that mentally the process of introjecting the breast is, as compared with this symbolic absorption of milk, only an unusual occurrence. The human mind knows innumerable symbols for milk and feeding ; for instance we all know that the analytic session is felt by many patients as a continuous flow of milk which gradually strengthens him and helps him to develop mentally, just as milk strengthens and develops his body. We could go as far as to say that the mind is in a perpetual state of ever absorbing mental symbols for milk. The fact that milk is symbolized in such a varied fashion is a well-known fact in analysis, yet the mental process of absorbing these symbols has, it seems to me, been completely neglected and over-shadowed by the more abnormal process of introjecting the breast *in toto*, which would represent a situation of extreme urgency and frustration. This function also suffers disturbances and interferences. The child is ever eager to see his parents, to observe their varied attitudes and behaviour and to take upon himself and to imitate many of those attitudes. The repetition of this continuous taking-in over a number of years gradually leads to the development of his ego, to the integration with himself, as part of himself, of many of the innumerable attitudes and modes offered him by his parents. If this process is effected within the limits of a comparative lack of anxiety, the child will be able to discriminate and choose between what he will integrate with himself and what he will subsequently expel, after a longer or shorter period of trying out and attempting to fit it inside his own self. Thus we see children—and this process is repeated in the course of analysis—temporarily imitating and taking up attitudes of the environment and subsequently dropping them. This process of selection naturally involves or means for the mind a certain splitting up of the parental images, and I believe that total introjection of part objects or of whole objects happens when an excessive quantity of aggression exists, which will convert the splitting up into an aggressive action ; in order to avoid giving way to this aggression the child will be forced to introject the whole object

instead of the various components into which he would normally split it.

From what I have said I hope I have made it clear that I believe the object may be split into its components before it is introjected, or may be introjected as a whole and then split in the person's ego. In the case of the latter event, the splitting up may become an extremely sadistic attack and hence the attempt to keep the object intact in the ego, which will result in its being felt as a foreign body. The gradual diminution of anxiety in the course of the analytic treatment will render it possible for subsequent introjections to follow their normal process of metabolism. Abraham has described the expulsion of the introjected object at the end of an attack of melancholia; on the other hand, Melanie Klein has referred to a continuous process of introjection and projection. I have not myself analysed a case of true melancholia, but, in patients that suffered from severe depressions and in other types in which I have clearly seen the introjection of whole or part objects, I have had the impression that Melanie Klein's description is nearer to the truth. There is not one process, but a succession of processes of introjection, as introjection is perpetually going on. When excessive aggression is present the patient will not dare to split the object into the normal components inside the body, or will not dare to split it before absorbing the various elements, and will thus bring upon himself the sort of foreign body which subsequently has to be expelled. With the gradual process of the treatment this assimilation or digestion of each of the introjections that are effected is performed to an ever-increasing degree, until the moment comes when the term ' introjected object ' has no longer any meaning in that particular case. Each new introjection is further digested, and the process of normalization goes on until the emergency introjection of the breast or of the total person has been replaced by the gradual and smooth process of mental absorption which corresponds to the absorption of milk.

The disturbance of the normal functioning of that particular form of introjection which I have called absorption leaves the ego in a peculiar situation. On account of this disturbance we may say that the normal interchange between the ego and the external world is stopped, or at any rate greatly hindered. The ego is not able to take upon itself all the elements of the external world and in this respect we can say that it suffers from a situation comparable to starvation. It would be a starvation due not so much to the external world not

offering the elements necessary for its normal maintenance, but to the incapacity of the ego, on account of strong aggressive impulses, to employ those elements. It would be a state comparable to diabetes, in which the body is not able to utilize the sugar. In my former paper I referred to depression as being, partly at least, a deficiency disease. I then spoke of the external world not offering all the necessary elements for the ego's normal maintenance; now I am pointing towards the ego's incapacity to utilize what is offered. In depression there would be, thus, according to this conception, both an external and an internal deficiency. The first would be of the type of avitaminosis, the second of diabetes.

In this respect it is interesting to remember that the process of melancholia and depression is constantly accompanied by disturbances in appetite. When the illness is extremely grave we come across a complete loss of appetite, which would correspond, in the mental sphere, to a complete incapacity of the ego to metabolize the external world. This is accompanied by all the signs corresponding to a diminution of the mental metabolic process: the mental capacities of the patient are greatly slowed up, there is a great lack of elasticity, which leads to a state of monotony. On the other hand, in less intense cases of depression we find not a lack of appetite but, on the contrary, polyphagia. I have seen a case of profound depression, with lack of appetite, which in the course of analytic treatment changed from this complete lack of appetite to a very intense polyphagia. This polyphagia could be explained as an attempt of an ego which was not so much affected to overcome and compensate the disturbances produced by its partial incapacity to metabolize the external world. The parallel with diabetes also holds true here. I know perfectly well that one can object, and ask what a mental process has to do with a bodily one: the parallellism between bodily and mental functions is very little understood at present, and I do not feel able to reply. But I may recall the fact that, after all, melancholics or depressives of the psychogenic type do suffer from disturbances in appetite. The improvement of the condition thus led from anorexia to polyphagia. I have also observed in another case that, with the gradual progress of the treatment, the polyphagia slowly disappeared and was succeeded by normal appetite; parallel with this, I could observe that interpretation in terms of introjected objects became less and less necessary, until we came to the point when actually there was no clear evidence of the existence of the so-called introjected objects.

There is another territory of psycho-pathology from which one could also draw interesting material for the study of this process of absorption, as opposed to total introjection of whole or part objects: I refer to hypochondria in various types of patients. It is usually stated nowadays that people who suffer from hypochondriacal feelings are people who have strong phantasies, to put it crudely, regarding introjected objects. In my experience I have found two classes of hypochondriacs which seem to me very intimately inter-related. I remember, for instance, the case of a patient of mine who suffered from severe agoraphobia and claustrophobia, and in whom I could clearly establish that she actually believed she had inside herself certain objects—mainly her father's penis. In this particular case the progress of analysis led to a disappearance of the more violent feelings of having a foreign body inside her, but unfortunately the treatment was, for external reasons, interrupted before it was completed. I had, however, the opportunity of observing another case in whom there were very clear signs of the existence of introjected objects. In this instance, with the progress of the treatment the patient did not feel any longer the presence of internal persecutors, and with the disappearance of this feeling there was a marked improvement in the more violent hypochondriacal traits. All the hypochondriacal traits, however, did not disappear entirely; on the contrary, another group of these traits came more and more to the fore. The patient began to feel dirty and to worry about the colour of his skin, of his eyes, and about the general state of his health. Analysis did not reveal the phantasy of a whole or part introjected object, but rather the feeling that his body was not functioning properly, that the food he took was not properly digested and therefore created a toxic state of his body. Now, we all know that this feeling has often been interpreted in terms of the phantasies of dead people inside the body—that is, as one of the results of the imaginary attacks upon the introjected objects. But in this particular case I was able to differentiate, or at least so I believe, between that kind of phantasy and the one I am describing. At the time the patient was having the phantasies of actual part or whole introjected objects, he had corresponding phantasies of destroying them, and hence he felt bad and putrefied inside himself; but with the gradual disappearance of the phantasies of a more coarse nature—that is, of part or whole objects inside himself—the phantasies of corpses in putrefaction inside himself were also gradually succeeded by phantasies of a more subtle nature,

comparable, as I have said, to phantasies of a food improperly digested. This is connected with aggressive impulses against milk, as opposed to those against the breast or the total mother.

Once the introjected object has been divided into its various component parts, namely, its various characteristics, each being a counterpart of the individual's libidinal attachment—once this has been effected, what happens next ? I believe that there is a good deal of evidence pointing towards the ego's using these various elements and synthesizing them according to its own needs. They all go to form part of the general structure of the ego, if I may make a comparison, in the same way as stones serve for the construction of a building.

A careful observation of our patients will reveal in them attitudes, modes of thinking, of feeling, of acting, defensive systems, systems of gratifications, which have been taken from the most varied sources. From the innumerable examples offered him by the environment, an individual will choose those which he feels are most suitable for him, experimenting with them, altering them to fit his own psychical make-up, and finally either dropping them if they do not prove satisfactory or incorporating them as part of his normal mental structure. An example where this can be clearly seen is in the development of painters ; a good deal has already been written about the work of art revealing the artist's handling of his introjected objects, of his destroying them, reconstructing them or preserving them from his aggressive impulses. But not so much has been written regarding the use he will make of them by integrating them as part of himself and subsequently making use of them to express himself in the work of art. To take the case of a painter, we can observe in his works throughout the various phases of his development the influences to which he has been subjected. An example taken at random is Raphael, in whose works during the earliest periods of his life the influence of his master, Perugino, is transparent to such an extent that it can be said that each stroke of the painter's brush bears the signature of the master. At this period Raphael was learning the technique of painting ; he was absorbing the ideas and attitudes of Perugino, and gradually adapting them to his own temperament. When later on he went first to Florence and afterwards to Rome, the examples of his new masters, from which he drew, added themselves to the already experienced influence of Perugino, fused and melted themselves with it and finally gave a new harmonious synthesis, in which one can see expressed, not only the various influences to which the artist had been subjected, but also the

work of elaboration to which his personality had subjected those influences. Thanks to this process, his ego gradually grew and developed by making plastic use of what was taken from the external world and a subsequent synthesis into a unity which was completely personal.

The process of assimilation and transformation of elements taken from other people is similar to what can be observed in the evolution of language. We sometimes see certain words taken from foreign languages and gradually transformed until they become new words of the language in question. To take two or three examples—in the Argentine the Spanish language has been greatly influenced by the Italian spoken by the numerous immigrants into the country, and thus the popular Spanish spoken there bears the marks of this influence. For instance, there is the word '*lavuro*', which is commonly heard and which is evidently a transformation of the Italian '*lavoro*'. In another Spanish-speaking country, Chile, we find similar examples of transformation of English words, used especially by people who have lived in the ports; thus the words 'Chief Engineer' have been transformed into the Chilean '*Chifinga*', while the swear-word 'son of a bitch' has given '*sanafabicha*'. Again, the expression 'high-born' is now transformed into '*Jaivón*', which in this case is really misleading, on account of its resemblance to another Spanish word. In this particular instance, as in many others, not only has the word changed, but also a new meaning has been evolved.

The comparison of various individuals seems to show that there is considerable variation in the capacity for absorbing and metabolizing the external world. I am inclined to believe that artists are people who have a very great power of absorbing and quickly synthesizing into themselves the various impressions they receive from other individuals and from the external word in general. It is interesting to note that in this new synthesis the fundamental influences which led to it can be detected just as the kind of food will have a more or less deep influence on the actual composition of the tissues. In this respect we can remark on the importance of environment for the building up of the ego; the constant presentation to the ego of certain elements or attitudes in the environment will, in the long run, contribute to the ego's either taking those elements into itself or devising a special method of protecting itself from their influence by a process similar to that of immunization.

I have nowhere in this paper spoken of identification, but at the

same time I feel that many of my readers would point out that some of the processes I have referred to as introjection or absorption could be just as well, or even better, described as identification. This is in fact a matter of nomenclature, which nevertheless bears some relation to the question of stressing more or less a certain aspect of the process concerned. As far as I am aware, Freud never made a very clear distinction between identification and introjection, and seems to have used both words more or less as synonyms. As an instance of this, his findings on homosexuality reported in his *Group Psychology*, which are considered by Abraham as further examples of introjection, are nevertheless described by Freud himself as identification.

Throughout this paper I have preferred the terms ' introjection ' or ' absorption ' because it seems to me that they lay special stress on the fact that we take in certain qualities or characteristics of the external world. This aspect, it seems to me, is very important, because it reminds us that in his relation to the external world the individual draws something from it, and this is not sufficiently manifest in the term ' identification '. There are, however, certain processes which might be described by that word ; I refer to those which, although very important at a certain moment, do not necessarily affect the individual very deeply—they resemble more than anything an imitation of the external world. Although, I repeat, this is merely a matter of nomenclature, I believe we could form a series. At one extreme we could place identification, that is, a process of conscious or unconscious imitation which does not go very deep in changing the individual, while at the other extreme we could place introjection of a part or a whole object *in toto*. In the middle of the series there would be the absorption of the various elements of the object, split up either inside the ego or before being brought into the ego.

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A NOTE ON THE USE OF THE WORD 'INTERNAL'

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I

The word 'internal' has a very wide and varied application in the psychological field. It is used to describe at least three different kinds of things.

(1) It is used for functions, structures and constituents of the mind, such as mechanisms of defence, displacement, projection and introjection, ideational and imaginative processes, states of feeling, characterological traits, perceptions, etc., etc. This set of things includes all the phenomena that have an objective existence in the mental sphere in the same way as material phenomena have in the physical world. In this sense 'internal' is equivalent to 'mental' or 'psychological' or 'belonging to the mind'. An example of this meaning would be found in the sentence: 'Though Mr. A. was as poor as a church mouse his internal state was so good that he never felt any want.' Here Mr. A.'s internal state might just as well be called a mental state or a state of mind.

(2) It is used for objects, situations and events which are creations of the imagination, as they appear in dreams, delusions and phantasies —such things as good and bad imagos, rescuing a fair maiden from the horrible dragon, being pursued by a wicked giant, etc. These are things which exist only on a subjective level in the mental field—which only exist, that is, in the sense that they are believed in, or thought about, by some person. In this sense 'internal' means 'imaginary' or 'fictitious'. An example of this would be the following sentence: 'Mrs. B. used to fancy that she was being waylaid and carried off by force. These internal adventures were so absorbing that she had no interest for anything else.' Here the words 'internal adventures' could obviously be replaced by 'imaginary adventures'.

(3) It is used for objects, situations and events which are specifically imagined as being inside a person, such as a wolf gnawing at the vitals from within or a huge penis filling the whole of the body. This is clearly a special case of Class 2—of imaginary things—and here the word 'internal' means 'imagined as inside' or 'supposedly inside'. In this sense we might say: 'little C.'s internal imagos frightened him

more than his external ones ', meaning that the things he imagined as inside himself were worse than the things he imagined as outside himself. So here ' internal ' means ' inside ' in a more specific sense.

The use of the word ' internal ' in these different senses would not matter much so long as it was always clear in what sense it was being used. But this is not the case. Supposing, for instance, we say : ' Miss D. was convinced that her eyes had a horrible glare and so she did not like to look at anyone. This internal handicap was quite unreal.' Here we may mean by ' internal handicap ' Miss D.'s conviction about her glaring eyes, i.e. the mental handicap entailed by such a conviction (in which case we should probably be wrong in saying that it was unreal) ; or we may mean her supposedly glaring eyes, i.e. the imaginary handicap entailed by such an attribute (in which case we should probably be right in assuming that it was unreal).

In this instance the confusion of meaning is between an actual state of affairs and an imaginary one. In the following instance the confusion is between an imaginary object thought of as being inside and an imaginary object not thought of as being inside : ' Since all these apparitions which Mr. E. saw were never seen by anyone else, one must infer that they belonged to his internal world.' If by ' internal world ' we mean ' imaginary world ' our inference is correct ; but if we mean ' imaginary world inside him ' it is not necessarily so—and, indeed, not correct if we take Mr. E.'s apparitions at their face value, since he sees them outside himself.

II

We see, then, that a serious drawback to the word ' internal ' is that we often confuse the sense in which we are using it. When we say ' box ' we usually know whether we mean a box on the ear or a box at the opera or merely a cardboard box. But when we say ' internal ' we do not always know whether we mean ' mental ', ' imaginary ' or ' inside '.

Various difficulties arise in the investigation of psycho-analytical subjects from this confusion of thought. It makes it difficult to discuss, for instance, whether an imaginary object is being thought of by the patient as inside the body or not. If we are arguing on theoretical lines, the fact that we are liable to call the object an internal one both in the sense of being imaginary and in the sense of being inside makes it almost impossible for us not to think that we have proved that the

object *is* thought of as inside, since we have ourselves made ' imaginary ' equivalent to ' inside '. Or, if we are arguing clinically, we are very likely to find ourselves saying : ' Mr. F. had phantasies of being pursued by evil monsters. His terror of them drove him to seek distraction in the companionship of friends and associates. But that terrible internal world overshadowed the world around him. No cheerful face outside could prevail over the gloomy figures within . . .' Here we shall find it very hard not to think of the monsters, which began by being simply imaginary, as imaginary monsters believed by Mr. F. to be inside him, although we have discovered nothing to show that this is so. Such a mistake, if made often enough, might lead us to set up a general theory that all imaginary phenomena are thought of by the subject as inside himself, or at any rate to proceed on that assumption.

Again, if we are discussing the relation between a mental trend, like, say, a reaction-formation or a feeling of fear, and the imaginary phenomena associated with it, like the copulating parental imagos or fearsome ghosts, we may find ourselves in difficulties owing to a confusion about the word ' internal ' in its sense of ' psychological ' or ' mental ' and of ' imaginary '. We may reason like this : ' Mrs. G.'s belief in the devil was very strong. He was a very powerful internal agency in her life and he had many of the customary archaic attributes, such as a forked tail and a goat's hoof. The existence of an archaic internal agency of this kind inevitably betrayed itself in her in many primitive traits of thought and conduct.' Here, by employing the word ' internal ' to mean ' imaginary ' on the first occasion and ' mental ' on the second, without realizing that we are doing so, we have managed to confuse a *figment* of the mind with a *function* of the mind. All we have succeeded in doing is to make Mrs. G.'s belief in an archaic devil the same as an archaic belief in the devil, which is clearly absurd. A clever and civilized person, if deficient in all-round knowledge, might believe in the existence of an archaic creature like the Loch Ness monster, in the same way that the rest of us believe in giraffes—that is, in a fairly rational way. If he thought that it was dangerous and wanted to destroy it he would go after it with weapons that were suitable to the supposed thickness of its hide, and would not sit at home and stick pins into a wax effigy of it. On the other hand, a primitive person might believe in an up-to-date object like a wireless set in quite an archaic way ; and when it broke down he might start mumbling incantations over it or threatening it in order to make it emit again instead of investigating the causes of the break-down in a

rational way. Of course the two factors—the imaginary object and the person's mental arrangements in connection with it—are intimately inter-related ; but they are not identical. And we shall have little hope of discussing those relations with any degree of success unless we know whether, when we call the factors concerned ' internal ', we are referring to creations of the person's imagination or to elements of his psychological structure and functioning.

III

It seems unfortunate, to say the least, that such a serious confusion of thought on such critical matters should have arisen out of the accident of an ambiguous word. But it will have become evident by now that this confusion of thought cannot be merely due to a verbal ambiguity, but must be connected with the meaning behind it. This view is supported by the fact that nearly all the cognate words for ' internal ' such as ' inner ', ' inward ', ' interior ' and ' intrinsic ', have almost exactly the same extension and differences of meanings ; and that the antithetical word ' external ' and all *its* cognate forms, such as ' exterior ', ' outward ', ' outer ', have a similar range of application on the other side. They can mean (1) what is material as opposed to what is mental (e.g. ' Mr. H.'s external comforts did not make up for his mental sufferings '), (2) what is real, as opposed to what is imaginary (e.g. ' Miss I.'s external world was quite different from her imaginary one '), and (3) what is imagined as outside, as opposed to what is imagined as inside (e.g. ' Mrs. J.'s external imagos were influenced by her inside ones ').

If we look around for the common meaning expressed by the word ' internal ' and its synonyms, we shall find it, I think, in the idea of insideness—that is, in the third group of phenomena to which it is applied in psychology. The reason why we are apt to apply the word ' internal ' indifferently to mental institutions, imaginary entities and imagos phantasied as inside is because, at bottom, we do think of them all as the same kind of thing, in the sense that they are all inside us, and because that common quality of being inside is of such paramount importance to our emotional thinking that it eclipses every other quality. For obviously the idea of insideness is imbued with a great intensity and variety of feeling. It carries with it a sense of power, mystery and special truth, of guilt, knowledge and ignorance. Thus an inward conviction is more strong and true than just a conviction ; inside knowledge is more knowing and often more guilty than know-

ledge alone; and an interior power is often a vague and mysterious kind of power.

All this points to the probability that this affective idea of insideness rests upon unresolved unconscious phantasies about situations, objects and events inside the subject himself or other people. Now by this time psycho-analysis has come to know a certain amount concerning these phantasies about inside things. They are, as we know, primarily occupied with ideas of discovering, destroying or seizing objects inside the mother's body and of keeping and preserving from attack the objects in one's own body. They are very early phantasies and they are motivated by very strong desires and conflicting impulsions of rage, anxiety, jealousy and love. In consequence they have become very highly charged with feelings of guilt and have been deeply repressed. They have thus become detached from the main stream of ego-development and have remained archaic, unconscious and not under proper control. On the one hand they are being forcibly kept down by various primitive defence-mechanisms of the ego while on the other they are continually finding their way, by illegitimate paths, into consciousness. They arrive there in their original, unmodified state and vitiate the functions of the defenceless ego—among other things its power to think rationally.

As a result of all this the subject will be in danger either of denying *in toto* the existence of his (or anyone else's) phantasies about inside things and states or of giving them too much room and too much reality; or, if he has a special interest in psychology, he will be in danger of making some kind of compromise and of regarding other people's imaginary objects as objects not indeed inside their bodies but inside their minds in too concrete a sense.

IV

The vitiating effect which these unconscious phantasies about what is going on inside one's own and other people's bodies have had upon psycho-analytical thinking itself are far-reaching and difficult to trace, since, of course, they operate upon the analyst's mind through his own unconscious. And yet it is of the greatest importance that psycho-analysts should be able to distinguish between psychological phenomena of a reality order and phenomena of an imaginary order, and between imaginary exterior phenomena and imaginary interior phenomena. They should, for instance, be clear as to whether a given character-trait rests upon certain processes of identification or upon

phantasies of incorporation ; and whether the distortion undergone by an imago is due to the patient having projected his own feelings on to it, or to his having imaginarily incorporated it into himself ; and yet the analyst is handicapped at every turn by his own phantasies about the inside and his reactions to those phantasies, which may mislead him into either overlooking the presence of such phantasies in his patient or into accepting their content as part of the structure of his mind.

Let us take the case of Mr. K., who, from being the calmest of mortals, has suddenly taken to having fits of rage, just as his younger sister used to do. Is this symptom an identification in the sense that Mr. K.'s ego has become modified to be like his sister or is it based on a phantasy of having got his sister inside him, so that his rage represents his sister raging from within ? Of course, both factors will probably be operative and interacting. But the analyst who likes inside objects will be inclined to see everything as the doing of the imaginary sister inside, and may even go so far as to assume (*via* the convenient word ' introjection ') that identification is the same thing as incorporation ; whilst the analyst who does not like inside objects will attribute the symptom entirely to imitative factors, due to guilt or emulation, the replacement by the ego of the lost love-object, and so on.

Or suppose that our patient, Mr. L., sees a phantom all in white which appears at his window at night. This phantom looks very angry and has curiously blurred features. It turns out that this ghost represents his mother who used to come into his room at night in her nightgown when he was a small boy, to see if he was masturbating. This used to make him very angry with her and he used to have phantasies of eating her up and so destroying her. An analyst with a bias in favour of inside objects will assert that the ghost, though apparently an outside object, is really an inside one, because its blurred face is due to the patient's phantasy of having swallowed and half digested it, and because its angry look represents his own internal state. But an analyst with a bias against inside objects will maintain that the ghost is obviously *not* an inside figure, since it appears from outside, and has the attributes of an external figure—viz. his mother in her white night-gown—and that its angry look is simply a projection of the patient's own anger upon it. As to the blurred features, he will probably account for them as being due to partial repression.

Thus it has become clear, I hope, from what has been said, that our misuse of the word ' internal ' is a symptom rather than a cause of the

difficulty we have in distinguishing between what is inside, what is mental and what is imaginary; and that this difficulty is inherent in the nature and status of phantasies about the things and events inside one's own and other people's bodies. (Incidentally, it is curious to reflect that the very reasons which throw doubt on the assumption that all imagos are inside imagos are themselves a proof of the power and extensiveness of those inside imagos.)

PRIMARY PROCESSES OF THE INFANTILE MIND DEMONSTRATED THROUGH THE ANALYSIS OF A PROSE-POEM

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Before putting forward the details of the analysis of the prose-poem, and the conclusions that resulted therefrom, I present the poem.[1]

REINCARNATION

The world was dark . . . black and dusty sepia with crawling green and livid putrefaction. Not a soul was about. The noiseless creep of the maggoty mobs moved from glut to glut. A flutter of wind made the noisome stench rise and hit savagely at nostrils which were not there. Nothing was there but hideous, cruel nothingness maniacally slashing this way and that; torturing itself to reach and crush a human sense.

And then it came. Out of that putrescent mass a seethe and slump, slow rising, slow sinking. And the air stood stiller, held petrified lest what it sought had come.

The stilled and overpowering stench closed up ready for its lethal spring.

The seethe appeared once more, took shape as an ' excrescing ' pimple, black-green with poisonous maroon purplings, and venous-blooded specks flirted with orange slits.

In hysterical rage lest death should rise again, the concentrated stench flung itself upon the offending seethe. And down it flumped, splayed out like a liquid mud, into the sucking mass.

But life was there, a flicker so small it only felt itself as there against the thing that pressed upon it; and in that knowledge was the last thread broken.

From out that liqufeying lump shot forth the foulest miscenations and grappling with the great flat lumping hand that held it down bit and tore it to shreds.

This done, it rose on all fours, struggled drunkenly its unplanned course, knowing there was a confine to the clammy, noisome world which held it. From out that confine it would hurl itself or, failing, know no more.

At last the goal was reached. Stripping the slime-weighted garments

[1] With the author's consent.

away from her stricken body—tearing away with teeth and nails a piece here, a piece there—at last she stood naked and torn at the edge of the murky, mud-bubbling cauldron that had held her. Frantically she flung herself from off the edge into bottomless space. For æons in that blank was held, and drifted in unconscious ecstasy in primal rhythm.

* * *

The æons passed and once again that naked body made movement, so slight it hardly could be felt—and once again the nothingness was roused to express itself against intruding life. The battle now was lightly played, and puff and duff, and flut and plut, and scuff and scut, the bodies squirling in and out each other.

And suddenly she was there—solid, full-formed, sitting on a stool. Arm uplifted. All brightness was around her. The light and blue and coolth of bubbling life once more filled her suffocating lungs.

Her uplifted arm worked swiftly and no breathless sound intruded. Out on that canvas she poured her life in one immortal ecstasy. Her life was done. She slept. An æon passed of sweet dreamless drift before she woke again.

In presenting the analysis of the prose-poem ' Reincarnation ' I have two specific objects [2] in view :

(1) To demonstrate the *process of thought* in the infant and so to understand the details of sensation and experience that go to produce the early steps in reasoning. Thought processes are at work at birth but consciousness of them as such is, of course, absent. This came out clearly in the re-experiencing of birth-traumata by the writer of the poem during analysis.

(2) To show that when the unconscious has *free* action in inspiring poetry, or prose poetry, no phrase or word is superfluous in the word picture that is drawn. The infantile unconscious practices, instinctively, that economy of language, that directness and simplicity in style that is inherent in good literature. The subject matter may not appeal to the reader or listener and the reading of it may induce an unpleasant emotion ; but, in either case, there is no denying the strength and vitality of the emotion expressed. The mode of expression may be new. It may function outside the limits set by traditionalists ; nevertheless it is impossible to get away from the above-mentioned qualities with regard to it.

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[2] Further points of importance are also presented in the course of this paper.

The author of this prose-poem felt, as it emerged, that it was depicting reincarnation. Reincarnation is the theory which she finds the most acceptable of all religious beliefs. In this myth we have the opportunity of enjoying life in gradation. As experience grows the individual is able to enjoy a greater and ever-increasing richness in the act of living. But this ideal is futile until release from the original psychological traumata of previous lives has been accomplished.

The prose-poem is in two sections. It gives the brief story of two awakenings into life—two reincarnations. In the first there is little sense of self-consciousness. Consciousness is only of the external consciousness—the ' not-me ' awareness. Self-consciousness can come only through free expression. Thus, in the first section, because external or ' not-me ' consciousness is of a distressing nature the birth of the world (or individual) is entirely unpleasant. When the unpleasantness is at last removed the world (or unit) once more goes into æonic oblivion. In the second birth self-consciousness appears and with it self-expression. Because of self-consciousness the opportunity for self-expression is there and is immediately seized. Life's rhythm runs its normal course—birth, expression and sleep. The cycle repeats itself.

In analysing a poem, or any work of art, we know that there are two aspects, or levels, from which it may be viewed : from the reality or conscious aspect and from the unconscious. The reality situation here is that the author felt herself to be portraying a conception of the birth of a world, and all there was therein—the greater including the less. She felt it applied, equally, to the universe, a planet, an animal or an insect ; in fact to all life whatever its form.

From the unconscious layer, analysis gradually revealed the specific meaning of the poem in relation to the infantile unconscious o the writer. While accepting for the moment the author's theories that the microcosm is a replica of the macrocosm in all its biological qualities, one was able, step by step, to reach the unconscious meaning of every phrase of the poem. Because of lack of space it must be given in a compressed form. I shall give a direct translation, adding explanatory notes only where it is felt to be advisable.

The scene is a cradle. A new-born babe is in it.

' *The world was dark . . .* ' indicates it is night. ' *. . . black and dusty sepia . . .* ' refers to the colour sensation of darkness. ' *. . . with crawling green and livid putrefaction.*' Here the reference is to the

crawling sensation of gases within the bowels and the colour-impression *' green and livid '* was due to eye sensations caused by the congestion from held-in breath. *' Putrefaction '* denotes a general noisome smell of enclosed body and napkin aromas. It is a picture of that darkness and its accompaniments and all it meant in sensation to the infant, run into one sentence.

' Not a soul was about.' This means everything was absolutely quiet. There was no other life or movement within that room.

' The noiseless creep of the maggoty mobs moved from glut to glut.' This is conveying the sensation of the gaseous movement of the bowels ; first in one part of the abdomen and then in another.

' A flutter of wind made the noisome stench rise and hit savagely at nostrils which were not there.' In this sentence is expressed the idea that the baby is only conscious of the discomfort of a bad odour and is not yet aware through which channel of its body the unpleasantness is being felt. In this instance through the nose.

' Nothing was there but hideous, cruel nothingness maniacally slashing this way and that ; torturing itself to reach and crush a human sense.' The *' cruel nothingness '* is the intangible thing that was attacking or about to attack. Fear is rising because a stench is gradually invading the air, bringing with it the recollection of what had happened before. (At birth a fæcal smell attack had resulted in a trauma that had considerably affected the subject's whole life.) The recollection was of an intangible *' nothingness maniacally slashing this way and that, torturing itself to reach and crush a human sense '*, that is, crush consciousness into unconsciousness once more, as in the earlier birth shock where suffocation was associated with a stench attack. Thus when fear of one attack is re-awakened the other fear is simultaneously stimulated.

' And then it came.' This means the dreadful stool or motion was on the verge of its emergence.

' Out of that putrescent mass a seethe and slump, slow rising, slow sinking.' In this phrase the pressure on the anus, coming and going, is described.

' And the air stood stiller, held petrified lest what it sought had come.' Here it is shown that the baby is holding its breath in fear of the immediate attack that would follow discharge of its stool, which it now realized it was beyond its control to withhold any further. *' . . . the air stood stiller . . . '* refers to the cessation of the previous noisy breathing of the baby through rising fear. Here the zenith of

fear is reached and the breath is completely held in, thus the air becomes *' stiller '*.

At this stage of the infant's career, a few days after birth, there is little or no sense of the ' me ' and ' not-me ' present ; and so we get the constant confusion of subject with object, and *vice versâ*. *' And the air stood stiller . . . '* shows that the baby is not aware that it is itself who has stopped breathing and has thus produced the stillness. It cannot as yet distinguish between its reflex muscular actions and movements from the outside. In this case the initial hastened and noisy breathing was brought about through anxiety and followed by the complete holding of its breath. Consciousness only comes through the interruption of pleasure sensations. All unpleasant feelings are at first projected outward and become ' not-me ' attacks.

' The stilled and overpowering stench closed up ready for its lethal spring.' Here is experience being postponed. The infant knows what it is fearing at this moment. It has experienced before, at birth, what follows from the emergence of *some thing out of some thing* (itself out of the mother), namely, an overwhelming fæcal stench. Previous to birth the mother and baby are one. Separation of this one-ness was associated with *an attack of fæcal odour* at birth. After birth this trauma is repeated every time the baby has an evacuation. At each separation of a motion from itself—again *some thing from some thing*—the infant is attacked by stench. This comes with every repetition of a disruption of one-ness. Thus all birth or separation is associated with attack. The baby and stool are one. Attack only happens when this one-ness is destroyed.

' The seethe appeared once more ', means that the peristaltic wave recurs. *' . . . took shape as an " excrescing " pimple '*, indicates that the anus is forced outwards. *' . . . black-green with poisonous maroon purplings, and venous-blooded specks flirted with orange slits .'* These are the eyes' colour-sensations during the period of held-in breath while the baby is struggling to hold back from its fate—the inevitable stool.

' In hysterical rage lest death should rise again, the concentrated stench flung itself upon the offending seethe.' This indicates that the final attack on the anus by the motion is felt as part of the attack by stench. The baby is only conscious of its struggle against the attack, which it knows from experience will come with the evacuation of its stool. The final peristaltic wave, which ushers in the end, is projected on to the attacking smell which will not be denied its prey. The

powerlessness to control is the reason for the use of the word '*hysterical*', that is 'uncontrollable'. '. . . *lest death should rise again*', means 'for fear that the infant should succeed and the bowel action be withheld'. The word 'death' is conveying the 'not-thereness' of the stool. If it is withdrawn and is no longer felt by the baby, as happens in quiescent intervals between peristaltic waves, then it is dead. The infant is trying to bring this about; but it becomes aware that there is a superior force which, growing, reaches the stage of hysterical rage and force. This force (peristaltic) within is projected on to the awaiting attacker, namely, the bad smell. The stench, the personified attacker, flings itself upon the *offending seethe*, the withheld motion—offending because it is held back—and down it goes.

'*And down it flumped, splayed out like a liquid mud, into the sucking mass.*' Here it is shown that for a moment there is a rest in the peristaltic wave. It *flumped* and is *sucked* back and muscular action is relaxed. '. . . *splayed out like a liquid mud*', is felt to have a two-fold feeling, the first of which relates to the baby's feeling of being splayed out and the second to the stool being like that. For the moment the whole thing is dead, not there. The word 'dead', when used by the unconscious, never means what it is intended to convey in the conscious sense. It is merely an absence. Its use here is to depict the complete momentary exhaustion and consequent relaxation of the whole body, as well as the temporary cessation of pressure through peristaltic waves.

The pace now quickens. The final act is sudden. There is a sudden increase of force and a complete evacuation. This is the story of the next two paragraphs.

'*But life was there, a flicker so small it only felt itself as there against the thing that pressed upon it;* . . .' The previous fight has left the anus weakened. It only takes the tiniest peristaltic wave to overcome the flaccid anus. The peristaltic wave was conscious of itself only because of the resistant pressure from the anus. '. . . *and in that knowledge*', the knowledge of the weakness that could fight no more, '*was the last thread broken*'.

'*From out that liquefying lump shot forth the foulest miscenations* . . .' The '*liquefying lump*' is the weakening and expanding anus and the '*foulest miscenations*' are the mixed things that go to make the stool. It is referring back to the first paragraph where the general feeling of mixture going on within is described as the '*maggoty mobs*' which creep '*from glut to glut*', and to the '*seethe*', and so on. '. . . *and*

grappling with the great flat lumping hand that held it down ', refers to the anus that, in the first place, held it back. ' *. . . bit and tore it to shreds.*' This is describing the forceful passage of the motion. The word ' bit ' has two meanings here, for biting has two separate qualities: that of hurting and that of using force. The hurting quality was felt, in this case, to be due to the scalding of an acid stool. The patient had been put on to bottles after two or three unsuccessful breast-feeds; and analytical material had already come up in relation to early feeding, which indicated clearly that the bottle feeding resulted in indigestion and vomiting.

' *This done, it rose on all fours, struggled drunkenly its unplanned course, knowing there was a confine to the clammy, noisome world which held it.*' Here the identification of the infant with its stool is again manifest. ' *. . . rising on all fours* ', is expressing the fact that it, the infant, kicked and flailed its arms about, ' *knowing there was a confine to the clammy, noisome world which held it* '. The ' *noisome world* ' was the dirty, clammy napkin. It knew there was a ' *confine* ', that it could get outside it (its previous experience had been to be cleaned up and removed from its clammy napkin), and so it attributed its escape to these limb movements. Again, in the word ' *noisome* ' there was the meaning also of noise—the sound of the infant's cries. It had been previously shown in the patient's analysis that noise, even though emanating from itself, was felt to be an attack from outside. It was so again here as one of the many things that were attacking at the moment. The infant wants to get away from it. So great is its distress that ' *from out that confine it would hurl itself or, failing, know no more* '. It was unbearable, if it could not be relieved of the oppression by these violent limb movements. It would refuse consciousness. It would blank out.

' *At last the goal was reached.*' This means the goal of getting beyond the clammy, noisome napkin.

' *Stripping the slime-weighted garments away from her stricken body —tearing away with teeth and nails a piece here, a piece there—at last she stood naked and torn at the edge of the murky, mud-bubbling cauldron that had held her.*' It is the nurse who strips her, but here again the subject and object are confused, or merged. The baby and the nurse are one. Discrimination is made only when unpleasant things are happening. That which hurts is the ' not-me ' of the external world while that which is pleasant is only associated with the self, the ' me '. So, in this instance, because what is happening is pleasurable, the baby

feels itself one with the nurse and so it imagines it is ridding itself of the *' slime-weighted garments '*, that is, the dirty napkins. *' . . . tearing away with teeth and nails a piece here, a piece there '*, indicates that the garments are being taken off one by one until nakedness, that is complete freedom, is reached. This is another pleasing and, therefore, undiscriminated action. The infant feels that it is itself tearing these things off with its *' teeth* (gums) *and nails '*, that is, by its frenzied muscular contractions. The nurse and baby are one again. *' . . . at last she stood naked and torn . . . .'* The word ' torn ' in this sentence is here meaning smarting from the stool. The *' murky, mud-bubbling cauldron '* is obviously referring to the motion.

' Frantically she flung herself from off the edge into bottomless space.' Once it is relieved, the exhaustion is so great that the baby immediately drops into a heavy sleep. The word *' bottomless '* conveys the idea of depth. There is no idea of time in the unconscious. It measures the space of time, in this instance, by the word *' æons '*. Thus, *' for æons in that blank was held, and drifted in unconscious ecstasy in primal rhythm.'* This was felt to be in the primal rhythm that existed within the womb, that is the embryonic or fœtal rhythm. In dream phantasy it was back in the safe place, the mother's womb.

Here the poem is interrupted. There is a long interval—the interval of æons before the next awakening. Then follows another re-birth or ' reincarnation '.

' The æons passed and once again that naked body made movement . . . ' The body is naked only in the sense that it is unaware of clothing or, in other words, of restrictions. There is no ' not-me ' discomfort from the clothes so the infant is just itself, the ' me '. Its clothes and itself are one. A slight movement takes place within it, *' so slight it hardly could be felt '*. But it was felt strongly enough to bring up the memory of the other times when there was movement in the body, which had been quickly followed by an attacking stench. The slight movement (gaseous) was sufficiently strong to constitute a threat. This is evident in what follows. *' . . . once again the nothingness* (of the primal rhythm) *was roused to express itself against intruding life.'* This shows that fear was re-awakened and conscious life resisted. But *' the battle now was lightly played '*, that is, is less violent than the last time. The onomatopoetic words that follow are describing the gurgles of gas in the bowels. *' . . . puff and duff, and flut and plut, and scuff and scut . . . '*. There is a softness in the sound of these words that denies the violence of the previous ' reincarnation '.

'*And suddenly she was there . . .*' is the second indication in the poem of self-awareness. Self-consciousness had been present in the previous 'birth' when '*she stripped the garments*' from off her, and that was the only pleasurable moment in it; namely, when the nurse was making her comfortable.

'*. . . she was there—solid, full-formed . . .*' means she was really awake and aware of herself. She is '*sitting on a stool*', means she is on the nurse's lap. It would seem the nurse was handy when the infant's sleep began to be disturbed and that she was lifted out of sleep and, in being seated on nurse's lap, had been fully awakened for, '*suddenly she was there*'. '*Arm uplifted*' is conveying that the infant is aware of its arms raised, in the way a child's arms are always up and working in the waking state. '*All brightness was around her.*' This means she is no longer in a darkened room. '*The light and blue and coolth*' convey the idea of light and sunshine.

'*. . . bubbling life once more filled her suffocating lungs.*' This indicates that even in this episode the struggle, through re-awakened fear of what was coming, had already made her shut off her breathing, and it was, no doubt, the starting struggle that made the nurse notice her and take her from the cradle.

On the nurse's lap '*her uplifted arm worked swiftly*', this being the action to which she attributed the ultimate removal of the napkin. Although the nurse does this the infant feels that its removal is due to its own arm action. '*. . . no breathless sound intruded*' refers to the grunts of withheld breath. This time there is no fear of what was coming so there are no grunts. The baby, by being on the nurse's lap, was already in the strategic position. Instant neutralization of the impending attack would take place. The bedclothes, which concentrate the stench and in themselves are suffocating, are absent. '*Out on that canvas she poured her life in one immortal ecstasy.*' This is a description of an orgiastic discharge from bladder and rectum. Freed from fear, she can for the first time enjoy nature's rhythm. The canvas is the nurse's lap. '*Her life was done. She slept.*' The relief, a pleasurable exhaustion, rushes in and is again followed by natural sleep. The sleep is dreamless because utter contentment is there. '*An æon passed of sweet dreamless drift before she woke again.*' Dreams only arise when life does not get its full expression. We have to get what we are hungering for in dreamland while asleep. '*An æon passed*' before she woke again to the next 'reincarnation'. But it is not æons and æons as before. Unconscious fear is one of the factors

which accounts for most heavy over-sleeping. The interval between the ' reincarnations ' diminishes in the absence of fear.

I have given a direct translation of the prose-poem into its underlying phantasy-story. The poet is recounting the past terrors of her life. As we know, repressed fears are constantly being re-awakened to life by the little daily incidents which we experience through waking life. The experience which was the means of forcing the unconscious to express itself in this instance had lasted for days. It was due to a workman, who had been in and about the house for a week or more. In every kind of way he thwarted the work being done. He was sullen and mulish and could not take any suggestion offered in the way it was given. And, further, he made known his attitude by inexcusable ' farts '. He was showing, by this flatus, that his sullen behaviour was to be understood as fæcal attacks.

This duplication of attacks by ill-behaviour and ' farts ' naturally aroused the unconscious fears of the patient to the highest degree. The unconscious fears were too great to be held in check indefinitely, so found expression by declaring her urgent distress in the prose-poem. Consciously the patient had felt no more than an ever-increasing weariness at the continual stalling by this workman, and was strained in her endeavours not to lose her temper. This, then, was the immediate cause for the poem. Its analysis, however, covered a wide field and much light was thrown on the analysand's reactions in life.

She found it difficult to work without someone near-by ; the work to produce a poem or article was, in the unconscious, the making of a stool. The need for someone near-by was the desire to have the nurse at hand to protect her from attack. As we have seen, this meant being cleaned up—the attacking thing being removed from her vicinity. If this were not done immediately, she had to suffer the full force of the attack. Further, when writing, the patient is unhappy unless she has a stenographer at hand. This is plainly having a nurse's lap available. It is only in this way that she can have the perfect conditions in which she can produce an article or poem (make a stool). It is the only way which will not involve her to any great extent in being held by it afterwards. The cl[illegible] napkin, which in itself is a danger, is borne with difficulty. The patient finds it very tiring to have to go over her work and reconstruct any of it—that is, *clean it up*. She frequently feels that it will *smother* her if she attempts it. Besides, she wishes to experience again the ecstasy of a complete evacuation *without fear*.

A stenographer, therefore, is the almost perfect nurse at such times. Her poems come, as a rule, in a great rush. This is as it should be. A true story is being told, even if it be an unconscious one, and any restriction by inhibition through fear will completely spoil it. When the analysand is forced to write for herself, that is, make a stool without the safety of a nurse (stenographer) in the offing, she has then to put the manuscript into typescript before she can proceed. The necessary corrections have to be made after this has been done. This procedure is the equivalent of putting the nappy into the chamber or, in other words, removing the clammy napkin before she can become entangled in it. She can review it when it is no longer a clamminess *on her*, her efforts to remove which had formerly caused her to become smothered and entangled in the bed-clothes. Thus she has first to perform the nurse's duties by removing the napkin, that is, putting her manuscript into typescript, before she can proceed to clean up the mess. Actually we do not clean up a mess. We clean the object from the mess and the mess, although removed, remains a mess. Thus we have again a good example of the same confusion of subject and object, for, actually, the baby is cleaned and not the mess. Since, however, this confusion of object and subject is conveyed in ordinary every-day phrases, such as ' clean up the mess ', it is permissible to suppose that what is unconsciously held to be the truth by this patient has a universal connotation.

The patient, when necessity drives her, can do all the work of writing and typing and re-typing for herself; but only by the conscious exercise of excessive will-power, with the consequence that she becomes extremely exhausted. She says that she feels *smothered and sick* the whole time she is at work upon it. She is working, it is clear, against the overwhelming fear of the original attacks of fæcal odour and suffocation, from which she suffered when her nurse was not on the spot to take her out of the cot before she made the stool into the napkin.

When working, she has always found herself obliged immediately to show the first rough draft of anything she has written to anyone who may be near-by, usually the person with whom she is living. If opinion has been, as indeed it sometimes must be, that it is not good, she has taken it to mean that it is a ' stink '. The response is instant. She feels : ' I shall be attacked if I publish this.' The act of publishing (which it is in her mind to do) is another symbolic stool-evacuation and she is reacting to the original fear of an attack by stink from the external world—the ' not-me ' world. ' I shall be attacked ' means :

' the stink will attack me if it is given to the public, that is if I allow this part of me to be born.' The attack is projected on to the public as being the only obvious ' not-me ' present.

This unconscious fear also accounted for her propensity for planning ahead. It was the preparing of a nurse's lap to receive her work, her stool. This was a useful reaction to the unconscious fear in her daily life, for it meant that no good work of hers was wasted through lack of forethought. Trouble began, however, when this preparedness could not be effected. She was then unable to go on with the work. It could not be completed or, if completed, it would suffer in style, since the degree of unconscious fear made it almost impossible for her mind to function.

She was told by a friend that the prose-poem ' Reincarnation ' was good (an unsolicited testimonial, as the friend had come across it accidentally) and he had suggested that it be sent off as soon as possible to a journal, which he named. Before this she had put the matter out of her mind. Usually she would bring a production of this sort into her analysis but, on this occasion, she was not having analysis. As there was no nurse handy, she had therefore put it aside. As soon as the poem was appreciated, she immediately felt the need to analyse it. But even then she could not find a convenient opportunity until she found herself quietly sitting in a room, reading, with her companion. She put aside her book and began to think about the poem. It was safe to try to analyse it then, as there was a *nurse* handy. She had previously thought of considering the poem from the analytic point of view when she went to bed. Bed had been used before as the mother's lap. It was an alternative ; but not quite the perfect one. It was true she was safe from entanglement in the bed-clothes whilst with the mother, but it was the nurse who was up and moving around and who rescued her from the stench. So the bed situation answered one purpose only, while the presence of the nurse answered both purposes. She would be there to rescue her from both bed-clothes and bad smell. When at last she was sitting in a room with a sympathetic friend beside her, she was able to do some analytic work on her production.

This same difficulty of clearing up after making a mess she found in the matter of tidying her cupboards and drawers once they had been allowed to drift into untidiness. On the whole the analysand is a very tidy person. Once her drawers had become untidy she felt helpless. If she thought of tidying them she would be overcome with

a feeling of despair. If she attempted to tidy them she felt she would be smothered. When she did bring herself to the task she felt smothered and sick all the time ; and when she had finished was often so exhausted that she would have to lie down for a while. It is interesting that after the analysis of this poem the author immediately indulged in a general tidying-up.

Another point of interest was her choice of words when expressing disapproval. She would say of a thing she disliked that it was a ' stink ', ' bilge ' or ' poisonous '. That is, everything which was unpleasant to her was coloured by this primary trauma. Unpleasantness meant two things—a suffocation and a stench. As I have already mentioned, these two traumata were first experienced at birth ; but the same traumata were repeated too realistically at every awakening after birth. Thus birth, waking and doing things were all linked indissolubly with these two distressing accompaniments. Every evacuation of the bowels became *a being born again*—hence the title, ' Reincarnation ', which she gave to the prose-poem.

The analysis of this prose-poem affords an interesting type of paranoid fear. During the analysis the patient, who previously had no fears or ideas of attack, was able to have paranoid ideas consciously, while retaining the reality situation well in consciousness. There is so much real attack in the world that it is always difficult to isolate these fears of attack as having an unconscious origin. Fortunately the patient was aware, from the beginning, that she felt things *too strongly*—that, while the thing of which she complained was there, she knew that she over-emphasized it. This awareness is not usually present in paranoidal subjects. I think this is explained, in this case, by the fact that her paranoidal fears were not brought about by the projection of guilt on to the outside world, for there was no guilt at this stage of the infant's development, but the condition was brought about by the infant's age, which precluded the knowledge that the stench was coming from itself. The stench was the ' not-me '. It was certainly remarkable that the patient was always able to assess the reality situation although, for the sake of analysis, the unreality situation had to be given precedence. In true paranoia this quality of awareness of the reality situation is absent.

It was this strong reality sense that enabled her finally to give herself up to the paranoidal fears of attack when they at last emerged. Indeed, she welcomed them. She was fully aware that the forms of attacks she was fearing were non-existent in reality but were purely

imaginary. The fear was of the nature of the previous infantile experiences. Thus, fears that people were outside, clamouring to come in and attack her, which were present in the later stages of her analysis, were realized for what they were and not confused with the reality situation, which was, of course, that there were no such people about. The re-awakening of the original experiences is to pass through them once more. And those fears had at times become almost greater than death itself. The patient had on several occasions been on the verge of suicide.

Further, she was to a remarkable degree aware of her own wishes to attack. This again is unusual in a true paranoia. Usually a person's wishes to attack are repressed and the individual is not consciously aware of sadistic impulses. The patient was amiable and self-controlled socially, but was aware of sadistic impulses to a degree which interfered with her comfort. These sadistic impulses could not be repressed in the usual way for, should she become unaware of these and not be permanently on guard to control them, she would be constantly putting herself in the position of being attacked ; and this meant to be attacked in the manner of the original attacks, namely, by suffocation and stench, for all attack from whatever source had this unconscious meaning. These forms of attack, as we have seen, were unbearable and had to be guarded against. So her adjustment to life had resulted in a remarkable degree of self-control, even in the most trying circumstances.

There were other evidences of this unconscious fear running through her reactions to life, but enough has been mentioned to demonstrate how these early traumata had coloured the patient's life.

I have shown how the mind begins to function. An unpleasant experience is a ' not-me ' happening. Through the removal of the ' not-me ' experience, the ' me ' becomes conscious of itself. It re-experiences something that previously it took for granted, namely, a state of peace. We have this realization present in the every-day phrase : ' he does not know which side his bread is buttered.' This implies : ' he will know soon enough, when he loses it, what its value is to him.' One becomes conscious of what one loses. But in the first place the baby refuses unpleasant sensations only because it has had no previous experience at locating the cause of an attack upon its person. When it becomes aware of itself (of its limbs—by reason of movement : of freedom—as a result of release from attack), such

awareness is reached only through temporary deprivation of a state of perfect peace. It had been suffocating, now it is breathing freely once more. Thus the infant becomes *aware* of the process and pleasure of breathing. She becomes aware that the *' light and blue and coolth of bubbling life* (bubbling breath) *once more filled her suffocating lungs '.*

True paranoia is expectation of attack, because one has first attacked. It was impossible for this infant to develop true paranoia at this stage for, until it became aware of the origin of the stench, it could not use its evacuation of the bowels as the means for an attack.

'And suddenly she was there—solid, full-formed, sitting on a stool.' She is aware of position for the first time, because it is a transition from a position of pain and distress to one that is pleasurable, and because it is associated with relief. The moment the infant is relieved from her distress she is able to do what was previously denied her. The natural bowel-rhythm is re-established. Formerly she had had to fight against the oncoming stool. She was fighting off a ' not-me ' attack. Now, with all fears relieved, she is able to experience, consciously, the pleasure of an uninhibited stool. Having expelled that which was within her, she relapses into the state of perfect peace which had previously been hers, and sleeps.

Only through the experience of being freed from a ' not-me ' situation is the infant able to become conscious of itself ; and it is only when this relief occurs that the mind is able to make its first realizations of the ' not-mes ' for what they are. For the first time she is aware of external reality. The things that clog her body and that frighten are removed one by one. She becomes conscious of this because this happens every time as a progressive series of movements, which recur before she reaches that final state of resumed comfort that had been hers hitherto. Repetition of the fear of attack on every awakening, and the knowledge that relief is possible from her first experience of it, teaches her to make known her wants in good time. She plans to get help in time. That this is so has been shown in the patient's character in life. She prepares beforehand for every eventuality. She is not caught unawares. She has made use of every bit of experience she has had in life. She can never understand how people can be so stupid as *not to look ahead.*

In conclusion, my paper has endeavoured to show predominantly two things. First, the origin of thought-process. Second, the value of considering not only every word that is uttered by mouth in analysis,

but also all products of pen and pencil which are brought to analysis by the patient.

The process of birth, the cataclysmic rat-a-tat of new happenings, the rapid impingement of an infinite variety of new sensations upon a body that has formerly known nothing but the condition of perfect peace, must leave lasting traces in the mind of the infant. All living tissue reacts to that which impinges upon it. The mind, as such, begins to function from the moment of the first ' not-me ' experience. Mind and body are one. The mind is a registering instrument of the sensations experienced by the body. It is a reasoning instrument, for it makes use of the experience it registers. It reasons about experience registered from its first ' not-me ' experience. It argues : 'after this comes that.' Lack of consciousness and experience of the external world may make its conclusions wrong, just as lack of full understanding of the universe to-day makes the scientific knowledge of to-day wrong in the light of scientific knowledge of generations hence. The human is born a scientist. It is of its nature. Repression or pain experiences may drive mankind into a state of insanity—from being a reasoning animal into an unreasoning one ; but fundamentally the human is potentially and inherently a scientist. From infancy it closely observes everything that happens within its consciousness and, arriving at conclusions, applies its findings to every-day life.

Its apprehension of detail is shown in the story of the prose-poem. The quality of observation is of that degree required in the making of a good scientist. Not a single detail is left out in providing for the fullest understanding of what has taken place. On the other hand, there is nothing redundant about it. The story is told in the briefest manner possible and presented in the mode required in the presentation of scientific material. No over-statement, no under-statement. There could be no over-statement of fear, which had taken the individual to the brink of suicide. Neither has there been under-statement, for the story is complete and perfectly understood. If it had not been complete, if there had been under-statement, there would not have followed the result—namely, the freeing of the patient from her difficulty in bringing herself to *tidy up*.

PSYCHOGENIC INFLUENCES ON THE APPEARANCE OF THE MENSTRUAL PERIOD

BY

KARL A. MENNINGER

TOPEKA

In his engaging *Book of the It*, Georg Groddeck remarked the frequently observed phenomenon that ' many women who have been parted from their husbands for a long time start their period on the day they are united '. He put forward the explanation *first*, that the menstrual flow is aphrodisiac to the man, *secondly*, that it is an attestation on the part of the wife of her faithfulness—' See ', she says, ' if I now have a baby it must be from you, for I was menstruating when you came and hence could not have been pregnant then '—and *thirdly*, it is a hostage against rejection, i.e. if the man fails to be as sexually attracted to her as she hopes and wishes, she has the best of excuses to offer her offended vanity. ' If the embrace is tempestuous all is well, the more so because the prohibition of custom is defied, and if it is not then that is because custom forbids.'

Clinical psycho-analysts, who have such frequent occasion for observing this phenomenon, would wish to add to its determining factors (1) the hostility on the part of the woman towards the husband, (2) her wish to prevent or avoid coitus,[1] and (3) the punitive symbolic self-infliction of her unconscious wish to castrate her husband. These functions support and are often supported by the phantasies that it is he who has castrated her (instead of *vice versâ*) and that the act of cohabitation is a bloody and pseudo-sadistic performance.

These latter psycho-analytic observations are so well known that I have nothing to add regarding them, but some recent observations of my own so sharply recalled the intuitive interpretation of Groddeck that I thought it worth while to set down the details. It will be recalled that Groddeck expanded his idea at some length to the effect that eczema about the face, cold sores on the lips, halitosis, clammy hands and other repellent aspects of the points of contact serve the purpose of testing out the lover and at the same time guarantee against

[1] It is certainly not difficult to recognize in the sudden and irregular appearance of the menstrual flow in brides on the wedding day its protective function: i.e. the menstruation appears because it is wished for or desired in order to postpone the pain and embarrassment so greatly feared.

the trauma of disappointment. ' If he loves me in spite of this then he loves me indeed ; if he doesn't love me it is because of this.'

The following pertinent observations were made on a patient who had not seen her husband for more than a year. The analysis was close to its end. The date of the husband's arrival was not determined by the patient although acquiesced in by her. Just prior to her husband's coming, the patient's resistances against the termination of the analysis had been under scrutiny and it had been recalled by her that the fear of being injured by the great penis of her father, which she had felt as a child when he held her close to him, was not alone a fear of what the penis might do to her but of the fact that he showed no external emotion or evidence of his desires for her : i.e. she felt she had failed to arouse him. This gave rise to an enormous fear that she could not or would not be appreciated as a woman by her husband just as she had not been by her father. She too, therefore, must conceal her real feelings, which in real life she accomplished by the assumption of a superficial urbanity ; in other words, there was on the one hand the fear, ' I shall be hurt, therefore I must hurt him first,' and secondly, ' He will not show his love for me, therefore I must not show my love or my disappointment either.'

The day her husband arrived was apparently one of great joy for both of them. They had very satisfactory intercourse. But some time that night she dreamed that she ' *so delayed the elevator in a store or office building by talking to the elevator boy that a man passenger on the elevator wet his pants.*'

She awoke and prepared to come for her analytical hour, which was early in the morning, only to discover that she had begun to menstruate, although it was several days ahead of her usually regular period time. She was greatly distressed at this because her husband was to remain with her for only a few days and both of them thought immediately that this premature menstruation of hers was an (unconsciously effected) aggressive device to thwart one of the purposes of his visit.

The dream, I think, in connection with the analytic situation shows this element of testing to be much more important, in this instance, than the aggressive element. The *elevator boy* represented, almost indubitably, the analyst ; *talking* to him symbolized the analysis ; and the *passenger* who wet his pants because he could not wait any longer was her husband. From the standpoint of aggressive tendencies, it is true in the dream as in reality that she is treating her husband as

she was once treated, i.e. kept waiting, excited sexually and left ungratified. On the other hand the more powerful motive seems to have been: 'I dare not end my analysis until I am sure that my husband loves me, i.e. until he cannot hold in any longer. I want to see emotional expression come from *him*. Therefore I stall in my analysis, i.e. keep "talking".'

In view of this I asked if she thought it might be that the premature appearance of the menstruation was similarly a test of her wish to see if he would love her in spite of it.

The following day she reported that she had left the hour much heartened and very much surprised to discover that her menstruation, which had been excessive, gradually ceased and was entirely absent by evening. (Her normal period lasts five days and she flows profusely.)

The following night she had a dream to the effect that she could now dispense with her parents and the analyst, the 'reason' being (in the dream) that her husband had had an erection! This I take as a further confirmation of the interpretation. The next day, which was the normal date for her menstrual flow to begin, it did begin.

The question immediately arises whether or not the first flow of blood which my patient experienced and which she assumed to be normal menstruation was actually that or whether it was a non-menstrual flow of blood containing no deciduous cells or other normal menstrual content. This, of course, I was unable to determine. In this particular case I think it is not so difficult to believe that it was actually a prematurely induced menstrual period which was in turn inhibited through psychological influences. The physiological mechanisms can certainly be conjectured with greater ease in such a case as this than in those cases in which the woman appears to bring about menstruation several weeks away from the date of its normal appearance. If, in the menstrual cycle, the uterine mucosa is prepared for a menstrual period, let us say, on the 23rd, it is not difficult to conceive of an acceleration of this process under the influence of psychic factors such that the actual discharge of blood and tissue begins a few days earlier, e.g. on the 20th.

If there are two kinds of uterine bleeding, one a normal menstrual bleeding brought about in part through the well-known endocrine mechanisms and perhaps in part also by psychological stimuli and, on the other hand, another type comparable to hysterical epistaxis,

which is also well authenticated,[2] then it would seem more likely that it is the second type of uterine bleeding which one sees in such cases as those reported by Freud, Abraham and others in which the flow of blood occurs under what appear to be chiefly psychological influences at a time considerably removed from that of the normal ovulation period.

One of my patients, for example, who was always quite regular in her menstrual periods, managed upon two occasions to ' menstruate ' irregularly a week earlier than the normal time, upon the day that her husband arrived after an absence of three years.

Another patient undergoing analysis was visited by her husband several times at intervals of three to six weeks. She insisted to me each time that she was highly pleased at the prospect of his coming, because she so much desired intercourse with him. Each time, however, upon his arrival, which was never unexpected, she was menstruating profusely. She rather reluctantly recognized the obvious implication of this serviceable irregularity on her part. In discussing the matter, I told her of the case reported by Freud, in which an otherwise very regular woman suddenly began to menstruate every *two* weeks when her husband, whom she very much disliked, took to coming home every two weeks to see her. Some time after this, my patient remarked that she was a week overdue with her menstrual period, and reminded me of this case of Freud's. laughingly protesting that it was scarcely likely that she would unconsciously postpone her period until the sixth or seventh week just in order to thwart her husband again. Ten days later, i.e. six weeks ' late ', on the eve of another visit from her husband, her catamenia reappeared ! [3]

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[2] Vicarious menstruation in both men and women has long been a matter of record, baffling physiological explanation. If we look beneath the surface of consciousness, however, we see in the light of certain examples exactly why, if not exactly how, it happens. Bryan (1926), for example (*Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **7**, 79), cites the case of a man who, during a certain period of his analysis, identified himself strongly with a woman, indeed, with a menstruating woman, and exemplified this during one analytic hour by developing a profuse nose bleeding which occupied his interest and attention markedly. When its significance was pointed out to him the nose bleeding promptly ceased. I myself (1934) reported a similar episode in a female, which had similar psychological content (*Psychoanal. Rev.*, **21**).

[3] In those cases in which there is only a slight delay or slight acceleration in the appearance of the period upon the occasion of the visit of the husband, there is an additional possibility in the way of explanation which should be mentioned. I have the definite impression that in such

We know definitely that the psychological factors can with a high degree of specificity increase the blood supply to certain parts of the body. Blushing is a familiar example of this phenomenon, and Ferenczi expanded it in his theory of the genitalization of the various organs other than the genitals themselves which accomplish their function through a temporary turgescence. It is certainly not difficult to conceive of a *psychologically* induced congestion of the uterine mucosa. We already know that such a congestion can be *endocrinologically* produced. It is theoretically possible that either one of these stimuli might bring about congestion to the point of hæmorrhage without the assistance of the other. It is also theoretically possible and empirically very probable that the two factors combine in varying proportions. It is well known by every woman that anxiety, fear, physical accidents, depressions and other emotional causes, can hasten the onset or entirely inhibit the flow of menstruation: this would indicate the co-operative function of psychological and endocrine stimuli in the induction of catamenia.

Until we have actually examined microscopically the exact character of the irregularly and apparently psychologically stimulated menstrual period it is probably unscientific to say that menstruation can be unconsciously brought about by a woman at any time of the month to gratify unconscious purposes. All we can say is that *uterine bleeding* may be brought about in this way and for these reasons, that this uterine bleeding may in such instances replace the normal menstrual period for that month and that the subject of these uterine bleedings is unable from the character of the flow or her own sensations to distinguish them from normal menstruation.

It has been my purpose in this paper to indicate again some of those psychological stimuli, i.e. rejection of love object, evasion of coitus, punitive symbolic self-infliction of castration wishes and in particular the less well-recognized one of ' testing out ', a kind of love trial by ordeal.

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cases—for example, in the first one cited—the husband sometimes keeps accurate tab unconsciously upon his wife's menstrual cycle so that he too may avail himself of this protection against the chagrin of impotence. It is as if he said to himself: ' I will go and see her; about such and such a date she will be menstruating. If I do not feel aroused by her—am not potent with her—and disappoint her, I can blame it on her menstruation.' This, again, would follow in spirit the suggestion of Groddeck, namely, that of testing out the loved object, a motive which it is my impression has been rather under-stressed in psycho-analytic literature.

UNTRANSLATED FREUD

[EDITORIAL NOTE: *Under this heading we are publishing selections from Freud's writings which, so far as we can discover, have not yet appeared in English.*]

(2) SPLITTING OF THE EGO IN THE DEFENSIVE PROCESS (1938) [1]

I find myself for a moment in the interesting position of not knowing whether what I have to say ought to be regarded as something long familiar and obvious or as something entirely new and puzzling. But I am inclined to think the latter.

It has at last struck me that the youthful ego of the person whom we have come to know as an analytical patient tens of years later behaved in a remarkable manner in certain particular situations of pressure. We can assign the conditions under which this comes about in general and somewhat vague terms by saying that it occurs under the influence of a psychic trauma. I prefer to select a single sharply defined special case, though it certainly does not cover all the possible modes of causation.

Let us suppose, then, that a child's ego is under the sway of a powerful instinctual demand which it is accustomed to satisfy and that it is suddenly frightened by an experience which teaches it that the continuance of this satisfaction will result in an almost intolerable danger. It must now decide either to recognize the real danger, submit to it and do without the instinctual satisfaction or to repudiate reality and persuade itself that there is no reason for fear, so that it may be able to retain the satisfaction. Thus there is a conflict between the demand of the instinct and the command of reality. But in fact the child takes neither course, or rather it takes both simultaneously, which comes to the same thing. It replies to the conflict with two contrary reactions both of which are valid and effective. On the one hand, with the help of certain mechanisms it rejects reality and refuses every prohibition; on the other hand, in the same breath it recognizes the danger of reality, takes the fear of that danger upon itself as a symptom and tries subsequently to divest itself of the fear. It must

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[1] [This unfinished fragment, 'Die Ichspaltung im Abwehrvorgang', was first published posthumously in *Int. Z. Psychoanal. Imago* (1940), **25**, 241–4. The manuscript is dated January 2, 1938.—*Ed.*]

be confessed that this is a very ingenious solution of the difficulty. Both of the parties to the dispute obtain their share : the instinct is allowed to retain its satisfaction and proper respect is paid to reality. But everything has to be paid for in one way or another, and this success is achieved at the price of a rift in the ego which never heals but which increases as time goes on. The two contrary reactions to the conflict persist as the centre-point of a split in the ego. The whole process seems so strange to us because we take for granted the synthesis of the workings of the ego. But we are clearly at fault in this. The synthetic function of the ego, though it is of such extraordinary importance, is subject to particular conditions and is liable to a whole series of disturbances.

It cannot fail to be of assistance if I interpolate an individual case history into this schematic disquisition. A little boy, while he was between three and four years of age, had become acquainted with the female genitals through being seduced by an older girl. After these relations had been broken off, he carried on the sexual stimulation which had been set going in this way by zealously practising manual masturbation ; but he was soon caught at it by his energetic nurse and was threatened with castration, the carrying out of which was, as usual, ascribed to his father. There were thus present in this case conditions calculated to produce a tremendously frightening effect. A threat of castration by itself need not produce a great impression. The child will refuse to believe in it, for he cannot easily imagine the possibility of losing such a highly prized part of his body. A sight of the female genitals, on the other hand, might convince him of that possibility. But he would draw no conclusion from this alone, since his disinclination to doing so would be too great and there would be no motive present which could compel him to. On the contrary, whatever uneasiness he might feel would be calmed by the reflection that what was missing would yet make its appearance, that she would grow one (a penis) later. Anyone who has observed enough small boys will be able to recollect having come across some such remark at the sight of his baby sister's genitals. But it is different if both factors are present together. In that case the threat revives the memory of the perception which had been regarded as harmless and finds in it a dreaded confirmation. The little boy now thinks he understands why the girl's genitals showed no penis and ventures no longer to doubt that his own genitals may meet with the same fate. Thenceforward he must believe in the reality of the danger of castration.

The usual result of the fright of castration, the result that passes as the normal one, is that, either immediately or after some considerable struggle, the boy gives way to the threat and obeys the prohibition whether wholly or at least in part (that is, by no longer touching his genitals with his hand). In other words, he gives up, in whole or in part, the satisfaction of the instinct. We are prepared to hear, however, that our present patient found another way out. He created a substitute for the woman's missing penis, that is to say, a fetish. In so doing, it is true that he had given the lie to reality, but he had saved his own penis. So long as he was not obliged to acknowledge that women have lost their penis, there was no need for him to believe the threat that had been made against him ; he had no need to fear for his own penis either, and so could proceed with his masturbation undisturbedly. This behaviour on the part of our patient strikes us forcibly as being a turning away from reality—a procedure which we should prefer to reserve for psychotics. And it is in fact not very different. Yet we must suspend our judgment, for upon closer inspection we shall discover a not unimportant distinction. The boy did not simply contradict his perceptions and hallucinate a penis where there is none to be seen ; he effected no more than a displacement of value—he transferred the importance of the penis to another part of the body, a procedure in which he was assisted by the mechanism of regression (in a manner which need not here be explained). This displacement, it is true, related only to the woman's body ; as regards his own penis nothing was changed.

This way of dealing with reality, which almost deserves to be called tricky, was decisive as regards the boy's practical behaviour. He continued with his masturbation as though it implied no danger to his penis ; but at the same time, in complete contradiction to his apparent boldness or indifference, he developed a symptom which showed that he nevertheless did recognize the danger. He had been threatened with being castrated by his father, and immediately afterwards, simultaneously with the creation of his fetish, he developed an intense fear of his father punishing him, which it required the whole force of his masculinity to master and overcompensate. This fear of his father, too, was silent on the subject of castration : by the help of regression to an oral phase, the latter made its appearance as a fear of being eaten by his father. At this point it is impossible to forget a primitive fragment of Greek mythology which tells how Kronos, the old Father God, swallowed his children and sought to swallow his

youngest son Zeus like the rest, and how Zeus was saved by the craft of his mother and later on castrated his father. But we must return to our case history and add that the boy produced yet another symptom, though it was a slight one, which he has retained to this day. This was an anxious susceptibility against either of his little toes being touched, as though, in all the to and fro between denial and acknowledgement, it was nevertheless castration that was finding the clearer expression. . . .[2]

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[2] [A further discussion of the topic of this paper will be found in Chapter VIII. of Freud's *Outline of Psycho-Analysis* (1938), *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.* (1940), **21**, 77–80.—*Ed.*]

(3) MEDUSA'S HEAD (1922) [1]

We have not often attempted an interpretation of individual mythological themes, but such an interpretation suggests itself for the horrifying decapitated head of Medusa.

To decapitate = to castrate. The terror of Medusa is thus a terror of castration that is linked to the sight of something. Numerous analyses have made us familiar with the occasion for this: it occurs when a boy, who has hitherto been unwilling to believe the threat, catches sight of the female genitals, probably those of an adult, surrounded by hair, and essentially those of his mother.

The hair upon Medusa's head is frequently represented in works of art as snakes, and these once again are derived from the castration complex. It is a remarkable fact that however frightening they may be in themselves they nevertheless serve actually as a mitigation of the horror, for they replace the penis, the absence of which is the cause of the horror. This is a confirmation of the technical rule according to which a multiplication of penis symbols signifies castration.

The sight of Medusa's head makes the spectator stiff with terror, turns him to stone. Here we have the same origin from the castration complex and the same transformation of affect! For becoming stiff means an erection. Thus in the original situation it offers consolation to the spectator: he is still in possession of a penis, and the stiffening reassures him of the fact.

This symbol of horror is worn upon her dress by the virgin goddess Athena. And rightly so, for thus she becomes a woman who is unapproachable and repels all sexual desires—since she displays the terrifying genitals of the Mother. Such a representation of woman—who frightens away owing to her castration—was inevitable among the Greeks, who were in the main strongly homosexual.

If Medusa's head takes the place of a representation of the female genitals, or rather if it isolates their horrifying effects from their pleasure-giving ones, it may be recalled that displaying the genitals is familiar in other connections as an apotropaic act. What arouses horror in oneself will produce the same effect upon the enemy against

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[1] ['Das Medusenhaupt' first appeared posthumously in *Int. Z. Psychoanal. Imago* (1940), **25**, 105–6. The manuscript is dated May 14, 1922, and appears to be a sketch for a more extensive work.—*Ed.*]

whom one seeks to defend oneself. We read in Rabelais of how the Devil took to flight when the woman showed him her vulva.

The erect male organ too has an apotropaic effect, but by means of another mechanism. To display the penis (or any of its surrogates) is to say: 'I am not afraid of you. I defy you. I have a penis.' Here, then, is another way of intimidating the Evil Spirit.

In order seriously to substantiate this interpretation it would be necessary to investigate the origin of this isolated symbol of horror in Greek mythology as well as its parallels in other mythologies.[2]

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[2] [The same topic was dealt with by Ferenczi in a very short paper 'On the Symbolism of the Head of Medusa' (1923), *Further Contributions*, 360, a paper which was itself briefly commented upon by Freud in his 'Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido' (1923), *Collected Papers*, II, 247. The whole subject has been treated at greater length by Flugel in 'Polyphallic Symbolism and the Castration Complex' (1924), *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, **5**, 155–196.—*Ed.*]

ABSTRACTS

General

Ludwig Eidelberg. 'Triebschicksal und Triebabwehr.' ('Instinctual Vicissitude and Instinctual Defence.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 3/4, S. 287–296.

The purpose of this paper is to establish a distinction between the vicissitudes which instincts undergo in the ordinary course of development and the neurotic defences with which they are met. Although both originate in an accumulation of instinct and a narcissistic injury, instinctual *vicissitude* removes those accumulations and injuries by effecting certain suitable changes in the instinct in question, under the influence of the external world; whereas instinctual *defence* tries to prevent them from becoming conscious at all, and the changes it institutes are done under the guidance of the ego and super-ego. Moreover instinctual vicissitude is directed towards the outer world and the future and is plastic; instinctual defence is directed inwards and to the past and is rigid.

The material upon which the two mechanisms operate are the instinctual fusions of aggressiveness and of sexuality (which are themselves based upon the two main biological instincts of life and death). But these are only visible in their derivatives, viz. in ideas, affects and actions. Such derivatives can be studied not only in the neuroses but in normal adults and children. Certain of them are associated with either one or other of the instinctual fusions. Thus, for instance, in the sphere of action, those reactive motor discharges which go back to sexual pleasure have the following characteristics: they involve pleasure for the object as well as for the subject; they can have both active and passive instinctual aims; and they are continued and completed by acts done by the object to the subject.

A tabulation is then made of the changes which instinctual vicissitude brings about in these derivatives in order to avoid an accumulation of instinct or a narcissistic injury. These include change of object, change of direction of the action (instead of saying: 'I am taking milk from my mother', the child says: 'She is giving me milk'), change from object to narcissistic libido, change of scene of action, regression, progression (instead of 'I spit out the milk', 'I micturate'), flight into phantasy and mobilization of the opposite element in the instinctual fusion.

In contrast to this, the defensive mechanisms, which set in at a later stage of the ego, either result in the child's completely suppressing his desires or turning them against himself, with all the well-known attendant ills of such a procedure, or in his carrying them out in secret from his parents. The second alternative leads to worsened relations with his

parents and those in charge of him, with the result that certain fore-pleasures like thumb-sucking, since they represent a flouting of parental authority, become end-pleasures and what should be sexual pleasure becomes pleasure from aggression. But there is a third alternative: the child can do the forbidden thing in secret from *himself*. This leads to cutting off certain portions of his ego and relegating them to the unconscious part of it.

A. S.

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Theodor Reik. 'The Characteristics of Masochism.' *The American Imago*, 1939, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 26–59.

Even to-day the phenomenology of masochism has not yet been adequately investigated. There is still no description of the peculiar features of masochism in its usual forms. The author describes three main elements which can be demonstrated in masochism as a perversion as well as in its desexualized forms. They are: the peculiar importance of phantasy, the necessity for a distinctive course of excitement (the suspense factor), and the demonstrative (exhibitionist) character of the phenomena. The essence of perversion is indeed that the phantasies linger on the preparatory activities instead of progressing to genital satisfaction. In the perversion with a passive instinctual aim there is a particular necessity for a preliminary phantasy in order that sexual excitement may be obtained. Masochistic practices are only an acting out of preceding phantasies. In masochism the end pleasure is avoided because it involves anxiety. The preponderance of this anxiety factor and the tendency to prolongation of the act is significant for masochism. The orgasm is feared because it brings the threat of castration and death. If the masochist has experienced pain or discomfort, he is capable of having the orgasm and of feeling intensive pleasure. Masochism is not characterized by pleasure in pain, but by pleasure in the expectation of pain.

Martin Grotjahn.

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Hans Lampl. 'Einige Analogien in der Verhaltungsweise von Vögeln und psychischen Mechanismen beim Menschen.' ('Some Analogies between the Behaviour of Birds and the Psychological Mechanisms of Human Beings.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 3/4, S. 399–408.

Lampl bases his thesis upon a paper by Konrad Lorenz called 'Der Kumpan in der Umwelt des Vogels' ('The Rôle of the Companion in Bird Life') and quotes copious examples from it to show the parallels which exist between human and bird behaviour, such as the parent bird's instinct to feed the inmates of its nest whether they are its own offspring

or not; the permanent fixation of young birds to their earliest object regardless of its species; 'marriages' between birds of the same sex; the taking over by the female bird, in certain circumstances, of the male bird's function of building the nest; signs of feelings of loss on the part of a bird if his or her partner suddenly dies or disappears, and of joy if he or she re-appears; imitative actions; a sense of racial purity; and numerous other strange instances of a similar kind.

A. S.

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Karl Mannheim. 'Über die durch den Krieg verursachten Änderungen in unserer psychischen Ökonomie.' ('On the Alterations in our Mental Economy Caused by the War.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 3/4, S. 346–355.

This paper, which is a contribution to a discussion held by the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society in March, 1940, lays emphasis upon the importance of selecting lines of investigation along which psychologists and sociologists can co-operate. Small social units like the family (which is what mostly interests psycho-analysts) are not the proper groups upon which to base a study of the changes effected in the individual by war from a 'peace ego' to a 'war ego', to quote Freud. The conflicts engendered by war concern groups of a larger kind, such as pacifists or communists or religious bodies; and it is the relation of these to each other, and, more especially, of the individual to them, that should be the principal object of our enquiry.

A. S.

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Clinical

Paul Federn. 'Hysterie und Zwang in der Neurosenwahl.' ('Hysteria and Compulsion in the Choice of Neurosis.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 3/4, S. 245–263.

Although both hysterics and obsessional neurotics have certain symptoms in common, they show a different attitude to them which mainly rests upon a different reaction to the anxiety underlying them. The obsessional reacts with an ego which has become unified into a single mental institution. The ego of the hysteric, on the other hand, is still mainly a body ego and has remained weak and divided. In consequence, that part of it which is in contact with the anxiety state is often itself repressed, so that the conscious ego becomes greatly restricted. (Incidentally, these repressed states of the ego, together with their positive and negative attitudes to their objects may, the author thinks, correspond to the 'introjected objects' of the English school.)

In comparing certain characteristics of hysterics and obsessionals which seem to be similar but are not so in fact, Federn points out, for

instance, that the obstinacy of the former is capricious and changeable because it is the outcome of many various ego-identifications, whilst the obstinacy of the latter is much more dependable since it is based upon powerful and coherent ego-cathexes. He also shows that in obsessional neurosis, in contrast to hysteria, physical anxiety is not present, having been overcome psychically. (This process, in his view, is what sublimation really is.) On the whole he considers that the more infantile ' body ' ego of the hysteric is connected with identifications with the mother, whilst the maturer ' mental ' ego of the obsessional is connected with a father-identification. The former type is, of course, more characteristic of women ; the second, of men.

On the analogy of his theory of ' incomplete ' and ' complete ' dreams, Federn makes a distinction between a ' completed ' and an ' uncompleted ' neurosis, the latter causing no symptoms but only a disturbance of the ego ; and he relates this to the fact that it is not experienced by a single state of the ego but by several. It appears that both obsessionals and hysterics can have either kind of neurosis.

As regards choice of neurosis, therefore, the decisive factor in early childhood development is the existence in the future obsessional of a strong, unified and ' mental ' ego, and in the future hysteric of a weak, divided and ' body ' ego.

A slightly modified version of this paper has appeared in English under the title ' The Determination of Hysteria versus Obsessional Neurosis ' in the *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1940, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, pp. 265–276.

A. S.

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Samuel C. Karlan. ' A Case of Psychoanalysis with Poor Results.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1940, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, pp. 149–158.

The paper is in two parts : first, a report by the State Hospital physician who observed the post-analytic condition ; and second, a critical comment by the analyst. The case was one of alcoholism in a superior man with more than average business ability. He undertook analysis because of feelings of tension, general discomfort in contact with people, and vague sexual fears, especially about homosexuality. He was analysed for two and a half years. At the end of that time he murdered his mistress in a brutal fashion while drunk. While in prison he developed manic-depressive psychosis with homosexual fears. He was twice removed to a State Hospital where he rapidly improved. The author believes that this case was not suitable for analysis from the beginning, that he was too narcissistic and that analysis may have aggravated the tension which led to homicide. The analyst disagrees with the author, feels that the symptoms were not aggravated by analysis, that there was marked improvement for a

long period in the analysis, that there was a very strong transference and that the homicide occurred owing to a combination of unfortunate external events before the patient was well enough to cope with them.

Clara Thompson.

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J. Butler Tompkins. 'Penis Envy and Incest: A Case Report.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1940, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, pp. 319–325.

A case is reported in which overt incestuous activity contributed to penis envy and the desire to be a boy. The patient was a middle-aged single woman in a masculine profession. Playing with her father's genitals began at the age of two and there were numerous experiences in childhood with him. When she was thirteen, he attempted intercourse and the patient rebelled. From that time on she was consciously antagonistic to him but remained unconsciously attached. The men in whom she became emotionally interested were usually married, or in some other way father substitutes. She was always the aggressive party. Although she had adequate knowledge of anatomy, she was very confused about the vagina. Her sexual desire was to press a man's penis against her clitoris. Her illness began a few months after her father's death. After masturbation, she began to feel that her body was becoming more feminine. She became troubled with waves of sexual feelings. Through conversion symptoms, she made an identification with her mother. There was much anxiety. Her penis envy was clearly connected with her early knowledge of male anatomy. When she finally attempted intercourse, having been the aggressive party in bringing about the situation with a fellow patient, she was unsuccessful because of vaginismus.

Clara Thompson.

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Hyman S. Barahal. 'The Psychopathology of Hair-Plucking (Trichotillomania).' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1940, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, pp. 291–310.

Pulling another person's hair is often an expression of rage. Pulling one's own seems an expression of introjected rage or self-punishment. The hair in many cultures is very significant as a covering of the head which is sacred, as a symbol of beauty or of strength. Thus damage to or mutilation of the hair can easily be a castration symbol. Hair is also of significance in states of mourning and grief. With this background in mind, brief reports of sixteen psychiatric cases in which hair pulling or rubbing was important are presented. Depressed, dejected moods were frequent in these cases. Destructiveness, impotence, and other sexual problems were outstanding.

Clara Thompson.

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W. Hoffer. ' Analyse einer postencephalitischen Geistesstörung.' (' Analysis of a Case of Post-Encephalitic Psychosis.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 3/4, S. 264–285.

From an analysis of a young woman suffering from various post-encephalitic symptoms it appeared that those symptoms were not merely of organic origin but were psychologically determined as well. They represented a combined reaction to a sense of ego impoverishment and of loss of penis (based on the castration complex) which the physical handicaps caused by her illness had set up in her mind.

A. S.

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Richard Sterba. ' Die Aggression in der Rettungsphantasie.' (' Aggressiveness in Phantasies of Rescue.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 3/4, S. 397–399.

This short communication points out that in every phantasy of rescue the would-be rescuer has first to bring the object of his attentions into danger and that he thus gratifies his aggressive feelings as well as his restitutive ones. The point is illustrated by several examples.

A. S.

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CHILDREN

J. Louise Despert. ' A Comparative Study of Thinking in Schizophrenic Children and in Children of Preschool Age.' *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 1940, Vol. XCVII, pp. 189–312.

This paper deals with the question whether the schizophrenic thinking of the adult, as characterized by hallucinations, delusions and misinterpretations, is met with in the phantasy and play of normal young children. The author, reporting a study of nineteen normal children, age two to five, and three schizophrenic children varying in age from eight to fourteen, finds that normal young children engaged in make-believe or phantasy play usually know that it is make-believe and moreover that they are willing, and often eager, that the observer should realize this. On the other hand, the schizophrenic children presented auditory and visual hallucinations and misinterpretations and the behaviour characteristic of these phenomena. Occasionally, upon repeated questioning as to the reality value of the phantasy, the child would persistently evade answering. On other occasions, the child would maintain and apparently believe that the phantasied situation was real. ' Pseudo-hallucinations are dependent upon the nature and intensity of the emotion experienced by the child rather than upon any characteristics specific to child thinking . . .'

George S. Goldman.

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A. G. Wòltmann. ' The Use of Puppets in Understanding Children.' *Mental Hygiene*, 1940, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, pp. 445–458.

From a material of 600 yearly admissions, ranging in age from two to thirteen years, to the Children's Observation Ward of Bellevue Hospital, the author describes, from group application to problem children, the diagnostic and therapeutic uses of puppetry. The hand-manipulated puppet of the Punch and Judy type is preferable to the marionette type, because aggression, as in hitting, and affection, as in kissing, can be presented more directly to even the nursery child. Various performances bring out reactions of oral, anal and genital aggression, fixation and guilt among the children. Therefore puppetry is an excellent medium for better understanding the problem child : he sees himself and others ; he has an opportunity to react to all kinds of situations because the make-believe nature of the shows reduces feelings of guilt and fear ; he is socialized because he experiences his reactions in the presence of other children. Going a step further than the progressive education which uses puppetry for self-expression, the author describes through several short case histories his use of puppetry to help a child to understand and solve its emotional problems.

Walter Briehl.

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Applied

Otto Fenichel. ' Psychoanalysis of Antisemitism.' *The American Imago*, 1940, Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 24–39.

If one wishes to understand antisemitism, sociological, historical and political points of view must be employed as well as the psychological one. Starting with a ' scapegoat theory ', the author asks why the Jews are so suitable as displacement substitutes. The strangeness of the Jews is of a special kind because of its archaic character, which is combined with indisputable mental superiority in certain fields. The antisemite uses his image of the Jew so that he shall not become aware of certain tendencies in himself. Strangeness is what the Jews and one's own instincts have in common. Circumcision, which is strange and familiar in the unconscious depths, works in the same way as the other customs which make the Jew suitable for a devil-projection.

The paper was written before Freud's book *Moses and Monotheism* was published. The motives for the psychology of antisemitism which Freud mentions are partly identical with those discussed by Fenichel. But Freud adds that the reproach ' The Jews have killed our God ' really means that the Jews do not admit that they have killed God. Freud also mentions that the other people feel a kind of sibling-rivalry toward the ' favoured

child ', and that hatred against the Jews is unconsciously partly a hatred against Christianity.

Martin Grotjahn.

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Martha Mitnitzky-Vagó. ' Ethos, Hypokrisie und Libidohaushalt : Versuch einer libido-ökonomischen Analyse der indischen Gesellschaft.' (' Ethics, Hypocrisy and Libidinal Economy : an Attempt at a Libidinal-Economic Analysis of Indian Society.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 3/4, S. 356–396.

The writer proposes to analyse, according to Freud's theory of the libido, on the one hand the hypocrisy which lies hidden behind the patterns of ethical behaviour that are subscribed to by the various races of man, and, on the other, the truth which is nevertheless present in them. For this purpose she has confined her attention to the Hindu caste system as affording the most striking case for an analysis of this kind ; and she devotes the greater part of her paper to a discussion of the position of the highest caste, the Brahmin, in that system. The prohibitions with which the Brahmin is hedged in are so many and so restrictive that his activities are to all intents and purposes reduced to the practice of asceticism—to a cult of the death instinct. His life or libidinal instincts can only find expression in various hypocritical methods of circumventing his taboos—such as his use of leather goods in spite of the prohibition against ' making use ' of any part of the cow. However, the writer concludes that the degree of healthy, overruling hypocrisy in the Brahmin is not sufficient to make his attitude of melancholy and rejection of the world a mere pretence.

A. S.

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B. W. Aginsky. ' The Socio-Psychological Significance of Death among the Pomo Indians.' *The American Imago*, 1940, Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 1—11.

The Pomo Indians of Northern California cannot comprehend suicide as we know it. To them every death and misfortune is the result of indirect or direct retaliation either from the ' supernaturals ' or from some individuals. This material was gathered by the author among the Pomo Indians of California on two separate field trips, in 1934 and 1935. When these Indians were on a journey and by themselves in the mountains, they often remembered transgressions and omissions of their taboos and were almost overcome with fear of the ' supernaturals ' striking them down. From the reports it seems that their apprehension and anxiety and fear became overpowering when they finally reached their home and collapsed. According to the author's information, death frequently occurred. The Pomo deaths which were not due to natural causes are

not comparable with the overt planned suicides in civilized communities. The psychological death of ' self-death ' was as real as death from any disease known to man. In some of the cases it was possible to cure the stricken individual with a ' ghost ' cure which is compared by the author with shock therapy.

Martin Grotjahn.

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John Dollard. ' The Dozens : Dialectic of Insult.' *The American Imago*, 1939, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 3–25.

The ' Dozens ' is a pattern of mutual insult widely distributed among American Negroes. The clean Dozens is distinguished from the dirty Dozens. In the latter, accusations of incestuous or adulterous behaviour are made in regard to the accused. In the former, jeers concerning the inferiority, stupidity or cowardice of the person addressed, or his relatives, are the stock in trade. The collective aspect of Dozens play is important, since the watching crowd serves as a sounding board for all insults. The Dozens does not countenance jeering openly at white people but it confines aggressive expression within Negro society. It serves as a safety valve for aggression in a depressed group.

Martin Grotjahn.

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H. S. Darlington. ' Motherhood Rituals of a Primitive Village.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1940, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, pp. 277–290.

In primitive rituals a village is thought of as a woman. When the population becomes too great, new villages (daughters) are founded and in some tribes in Assam the rituals accompanying the founding of a new village represent coitus, impregnation and birth. The rituals are described and their sexual symbolism explained.

Clara Thompson.

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Jules de Leeuwe. ' Über die Entstehung religiöser Vorstellungen.' (' Concerning the Origin of Religious Ideas.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 3/4, S. 430–443.

Writing with reference to *Moses and Monotheism*, the author is somewhat critical of Freud's view that a belief in God comes from inherited racial memories of the primal father. He is more inclined to attribute it to ontogenetic factors, such as the child's relationship to its father and a diffusion of its early narcissistic self-feeling. He considers that monotheism, as distinct from polytheism, is a result of the individual's increasing power, as he grows up, to abstract and generalize.

A. S.

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M. Levi Bianchini. ' Die psychoanalytische Traumtheorie in einem Distichon aus dem dritten nachchristlichen Jahrhundert.' (' The Psycho-

Analytical Theory of Dreams as contained in a Couplet of the Third Century A.D.') *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse und Imago*, 1940, Bd. XXV, Heft 3/4, S. 409–417.

A Greek couplet by Dionysius Cato, a Latin moralist living in the third century after Christ, runs as follows: 'Set no store by dreams; for the human soul sees in sleep as a true fact that which it desires in its waking hours.' This, written in an age of religious superstition, denies all prophetic and metaphysical significance to dreams and anticipates by fifteen hundred years Freud's scientific analysis of them.

A. S.

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Martin Grotjahn. 'Ferdinand the Bull.' *The American Imago*, 1940, Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 33–41.

The story of Ferdinand the Bull (written by Munro Leaf and illustrated by R. Lawson) is the story of an innocent little calf who gets older and stronger but refuses to grow up. He refuses to fight in the bull ring of Madrid and avoids dying like a guilty Œdipus. The cork tree, so important in the illustrations of the book, represents both the ridiculed father and the loving mother. Ferdinand is not a sacred symbol of the father and so escapes the fate of a totem animal. Ferdinand not only successfully avoids the fate of Œdipus; he is also the depreciated father about whom the son laughs before he identifies himself with him. Like Charlie Chaplin, Ferdinand simply refuses to accept defeat by reality. He gains his significant inner security and harmony by his knowledge of possessing father and mother. The disguise of the true meaning of the story of Ferdinand seems to be a successful one: a totem animal and father imago is depreciated, killed and revived in a form acceptable to the super-ego.

Author's Abstract.

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A. N. Foxe. 'Terrorization of the Libido and Snow White.' *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1940, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, pp. 114–148.

Libido may be terrorized from within or from an outside threat. 'Snow White' is an example of terrorization by a stepmother or a projected super-ego. Snow White's mother wishes for a child white as snow, red as blood and black as ebony. This last seems to have been a phantasy of death and she dies as Snow White is born. Snow White is conceived in great hate, which is satisfied by her mother's death. Then the hate appears in the stepmother, who also destroys herself in competition with Snow White. The various threats to Snow White's life represent oral, anal and genital stages of her development.

Clara Thompson.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Relativity of Reality. By René Laforgue. (Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, New York, 1940. Pp. 92. Price, $2.50.)

Dr. Laforgue sets himself ambitious aims in this book, which should prove to have stimulating effects. After a preliminary chapter on anxiety and the various defences against it, he proceeds to give an account of the early affective development in which he adopts a not very convincing compromise between the views of the Viennese and British schools of work; while accepting the idea of an early pregenital super-ego he is inclined to regard this not, as most of us do, as being built up of reactions against early infantile phantasies, but as an inherited disposition.

Freud's pre-Œdipus stage of development, which to many of us is simply an early Œdipus stage of a particularly sadistic kind, Dr. Laforgue for some reason identifies with a homosexual phase: 'In the pre-Œdipus period it is not love for the mother that predominates in the boy, nor love for the father in the girl, on the contrary: the boy loves his father sexually and the girl her mother. We are right in the midst of the homosexual stage in the development of sexuality. And this stage has conflicts particular to it. We call it the negative Œdipus complex stage' (p. 24).

He gives a comprehensive description of the anal character type, particularly of its intellectual apperception of reality, in contrast with that of a somewhat idealized genital type. Here one has the impression that the types described represent bold generalizations from particular observations rather than a convincing account of universally valid conclusions. This statement will illustrate the point: 'The anal ego in this way determines authoritative attitudes: it would fain overpower everything that causes it to fear. This authoritative attitude is reinforced by another no less characteristic: that of wearing blinders to admit of reality only that which it finds pleasing and to exclude whatever is distasteful. This corresponds to the anal individual's refusal to accept the difference between the sexes. He is attracted only to what resembles him, in the measure that he invests whatever interests him with his own personality. The anal ego therefore makes no effort to collaborate with the opposite sex, which is different from or perhaps opposed to it. Collaboration implies acceptance of sexual relations which the anal ego tends to ignore, indeed, it is even this that predetermines its attitude. The anal ego causes the individual to be overbearing, brutal, vain, conceited and opinionated' (p. 68).

Then follows the main theme of the book. It is that our conceptions of reality are relative in the sense that they depend on a particular phase of libidinal development reached at the time. Dr. Laforgue specially

contrasts the attitude towards reality in the anal phase with that in the genital phase. He maintains that logic, with the sense of causality and relationship, scarcely exists at the anal stage. It belongs to the genital one, being inspired by the desire to understand the sex differences and the mystery of parental coitus. Religion belongs to the intermediate stage between the anal and genital one. For some reason he does not mention, Dr. Laforgue considers polytheism to be earlier and more primitive than monotheism : in fact, ' thus the synthesis of a personality would correspond to belief in the one God ' (p. 54). Scientific thinking dispenses with dependence on both magic and protective divinity ; in it the ego seeks to act directly upon the source of danger of rational knowledge and its nature.

In the next chapter, on the intellect, Dr. Laforgue tends to identify ' phallic ' with ' genital '. He distinguishes sharply between the masculine and feminine intellect and suggests that the latter is of the anal type. The final chapter deals with the theme of free will, liberty and death. ' Belief in free will is in direct proportion to an individual's notion of omnipotence ' (p. 87). So is the belief in immortality. When an individual has quite accepted the knowledge that his powers are limited then he can face the idea of death.

The book is adequately translated, apart from a few quaintnesses (e.g. ' we will more closely examine ') and an imperfect knowledge of psycho-analytical terminology, such as when *Gegenbesetzung* is translated by ' counterbalance ' and ' conscience ' written in place of ' consciousness '.

E. J.

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Man on His Nature. (The Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1937–38.) By Sir Charles Sherrington. (Cambridge University Press, 1940. Pp. 413. Price, 21*s*.)

This book is in effect a creative synthesis of the achievements and outlook of the ' natural sciences ' on Man. It is substantial and packed with detail requiring close attention, but it is written in a vital individual style that of itself sustains the reader's interest. It is a book that any specialist could read with advantage. Moreover, it contains a great deal of particular interest to analysts, though direct references to psychoanalysis are few. Indeed, as will be shown later, this would seem to be the only subject about which the author's wide knowledge is not completely up to date. His conclusions are sometimes more in line with our theory than he himself realizes. In a brief review it is impossible to do anything like justice even to matters of special interest to us ; a few only may be mentioned.

The distinctive features of modern scientific thinking are brought out by comparison with the views of the sixteenth century philosopher-

physician, Jean Fernel. In addition to its immediate purpose, this study affords fascinating glimpses both of the wealth and of the unconsciously determined limitations of human phantasy as expressed in scientific thought and of the gradual pruning of phantasy by observation of fact that plays such an important rôle in the advance of knowledge. The author is well aware of the human trend to ' anthropism ' in accounting for the ' how ' of things. Thus he relates the appearance of concepts such as Causation, a ' prime Mover ', etc., to the individual's (' sub-conscious ') tendency to supply explanations on the basis of his experience of his ' I's ' doings. He states clearly that both the energy-concept of the modern physicist, embracing, as it does, all that is perceptible to our senses, and the concept of mind, of experience not open to direct observation through any sense-organ, are to be understood as concepts, mental constructions, ' two ways of one mind '. This mind is as much a product of evolution on this planet's side and of the earth earthy as our body : ' Mind's earthliness innately shapes all it does, perhaps most so when it tries to be unearthly.' (p. 166.)

Science has not solved the enigma of the relation between body and mind. ' The " how " between mental action and chemical action is still to seek. There is none the less a 100 per cent. correlation as regards " place " and " time " between finite mind and chemical action in the brain.' (pp. 163–4.) Evolution, like common sense, treats body and mind together as belonging to a concrete unity. The physiologist can tell us how the intricate apparatus of vision works but has nothing to say about ' mental seeing '. Mind as experienced remains outside the energy concept, all attempts at demonstrating the existence of mental energy, in the physicist's meaning of the term, having so far failed. Nevertheless, it is an established fact that the brain is the ' organ of liaison ' between mind and body and the cortex the most important site of their ' contact utile '. ' For a class-room to exhibit an isolated brain-cell and label it large " The organ of thought " may be dramatic pedagogy ; it is certainly pedagogic overstatement. The cell-organization of the brain may be the key to the secret of its correlation with mind ; but not, it would seem, by individual mental endowment of its constituent cells.' (pp. 268–9.) However, ' the brain region which we may call " mental " is not a concentration into one cell but an enormous expansion into millions of cells. They are, it is true, richly interconnected. Where it is a question of " mind " the nervous system does not integrate itself by centralization upon one pontifical cell. Rather it elaborates a millionfold democracy whose each unit is a cell.' (p. 277.) This state of affairs correlates perfectly with what psycho-analysis has recognized as the complexity and intricacy and withal, plasticity, of ego-organization. The author recognizes the multiplicity of processes underlying mind and finds these in striking contrast to the unity

of the resultant mental experience, the singleness of a ' focal ' motor act, the unity of perception, the ' I 'ness of the ego (though he appreciates the concept ' self ' is intricate). We are more accustomed to stress the complexity of ego-organization and the relativity of ego integration. Thus when we read ' Matter and energy seem granular in structure and so does " life " but not so mind ' (p. 278), we cannot agree unreservedly.

The lower limit of ' recognizable mind ' is difficult to define. ' Not that there would seem any inherent unlikelihood in mind attaching in some degree to an individual consisting of one single cell. . . . The improbability is, however, that mind of such degree should be recognizable by us as mind.' (p. 102.) ' Progress under evolution takes the direction of increased complexity of organization.' (p. 153.) ' The complexity introduces recognizable mind. It does so gradually and nurses it into flower.' (p. 143.) It would appear that integration *viâ* the nervous system is an integration *sui generis* enabling the organism to become a motor unity. The motor act has been the nurse or cradle of ' recognizable mind '. Mind must count, otherwise the direction of evolution would not appear to be ' mind and yet more mind '. It has counted because it is by the range, flexibility and fine adjustment with which it endows our motor reactions that we have acquired so much more control of our external environment than any other animal. (One is reminded here of Freud's view of consciousness as the gateway to motility and of thinking as internal ' sampling ' of action.)

The chapters dealing with the brain are among the most interesting in the book as might be expected, since the author is our leading physiologist of the nervous system. Only one general conclusion can be mentioned here, namely, that in spite of the ' gross ' correlation between brain and mind the physiologist and psychologist cannot be of much assistance to one another. For instance, '. . . what has cerebral physiology to offer on the whole subject of " anxiety " ? The psychiatrist has perforce to go on his way seeking things more germane to what he needs.' (p. 289.) ' Neither with Aristotle nor with Freud does their aloofness from all anatomy of the brain hinder their study of mind from being a great advance in the subject.' (p. 240.)

The author recognizes the existence of ' subconscious ' mental activity, e.g. the ' unargued inference ' involved in perception, but thinks that his conception of the ' sub-conscious ' is something quite different from Freud's. Thus, ' it is as though our mind were a pool of which the movements on the surface only are what we experience. . . The mind which we experience, that is, which *is* our mental experience, seems to emerge from elements of mind which we do not experience. Here we have not to do with the unconscious of Freud which is only temporarily unconscious, and has been conscious once and may be again. That belongs to a mind of a

different grade, and a sphere of reaction other than that we are thinking of now. In our rough simile of the pool, the unconscious of Freud would be itself of the surface of the pool, but a piece of surface which lay as it were by a charm restrained for the time from entering activity, and therefore from participating in the general consciousness, a restraint which we might correlate with the inhibition which visits the nervous system far and wide.' (p. 307–8.) It would seem that the author has in mind Freud's earlier view of the unconscious as equated with the repressed and not the later concept of the id. This is wide enough to include the whole depth of the pool. We have no reason to doubt correlation between physiological inhibition ' and psychological processes of ' barring ' from consciousness and motility. We have good reason to assume however that these are not all the same. Thus repression and inhibition are regarded by us as two different mental mechanisms. The temporarily inhibited piece of surface is more akin to our pre-conscious than to the unconscious.

The author regards all living beings as driven by ' urge-to-live ' ; this in beings with mind becomes ' zest-to-live '. At least he writes : ' We can call it zest, and zest it often is, but who shall say where, traced along life's scale of forms receding from man's own, zest becomes blind drive, and drive retreats into mindless urge ? . . . To think of the vast nether flood of " urge-to-live " as mere " will-to-live " is to miss the meaning of the whole subconscious world whence man has come, and in part still belongs. " Urge-to-live " is an immense natural situation, greatly older and far wider than " will " can embrace. It was a biological " law " before " will " came to be.' (p. 193.) ' In lives which have discoverable mind, it is as though mind implements that " urge-to-live ". . . . We can call it then " instinct of self-preservation ", etc.' (p. 378.) Possibly in that ' etc.' differentiation into a variety of instincts is allowed for. At least in the struggle for life ' " zest-to-live " develops as its corollary " zest to kill ".' (p. 379.)

Space will permit only the briefest reference to considerations regarding the status and ' values ' of man, the only ' moral ' being in nature. ' There is nothing good or bad except himself.' (p. 383.) Altruism is regarded as the crowning human sublimation of ' love-of-life ' and the future of humanity and of the planet itself depends upon whether the predacious or the altruistic type of human being prevails. ' The loveliest friend of man is man.' (p. 393.) ' We have, because human, an inalienable prerogative of responsibility which we cannot devolve, no, not as once was thought, even upon the stars. We can share it only with each other.' (p. 404.)

Marjorie Brierley.

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New Facts on Mental Disorders : Study of 89,190 Cases. By Neil A. Dayton. (Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois ; Baillière, Tindall & Cox, London, 1940. Pp. xxxiv + 486. Price, 25*s*.)

This book presents the results of a statistical investigation from many different angles of all admissions to mental hospitals in Massachusetts from 1917 to 1933. A statistician would doubtless regard the method of presentation as a popular one, for there is no statistical jargon nor mathematics and the results are presented in simple diagrammatic form. The way in which conclusions are drawn from the figures sometimes appears facile and arbitrary and suggests a confusion of *post hoc* with *propter hoc*, but this impression is probably due to the simplified method of presentation.

The title of the book suggests, however, that we are invited to consider the facts rather than any theories based on them, and certainly a number of striking facts emerge from this study, such as the following :—

(1) The first year of prohibition coincided with a precipitate drop of 15 per cent. in the admission rate. This was due only in part to a reduction of over 50 per cent. in alcoholic psychoses. Dementia præcox decreased 9 per cent. in males and 20 per cent. in females ; and involutional psychoses 19 per cent. in males and 29 per cent. in females.

(2) Admissions of patients under forty are steadily decreasing, but those over fifty are increasing. Allowing for the number of the total population living at a given age, the admission rate rises steadily with age, reaching its maximum between the ages of eighty and eighty-nine. Thus the prevalent idea that the middle years are those most liable to mental disorder is a statistical fallacy.

(3) Provided one lives to a ripe age, one has a much higher chance of either a senile or an arteriosclerotic psychosis in the course of one's life than of having any other psychosis whatever. (This does not merely mean any other *single* psychosis.)

(4) The married status appears to be a protection against mental disorder, but this applies much more forcibly to men then to women. Single women show an excess of 80 per cent. over the married, and single men 200 per cent. ; divorced women 230 per cent. and divorced men 400 per cent. The widowed show an admission rate intermediate between the married and the single—45 per cent. above the married in women and 130 per cent in men. This last fact shows that the differences cannot be entirely accounted for by supposing that the less stable remain single or get divorced. These figures are indeed striking and seem to corroborate psycho-analytical views on the defensive value of libidinal factors.

This book is likely to remain for a considerable time a most useful storehouse of facts, of which the foregoing are only a few. It is to be hoped that due caution will be exercised in their interpretation.

W. Hewitt Gillespie.

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Clinical Studies in Psychopathology : A Contribution to the Ætiology of Neurotic Illness. By Henry V. Dicks. (Edward Arnold & Co., London, 1939. Pp. 248. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.*)

The author of this volume, an Assistant Director of the Tavistock Clinic, is an avowed eclectic in the field of psycho-pathology. His chief reasons for not becoming an orthodox Freudian are, to use his own words, ' the many valid and valuable things which Freudians do *not* accept, not least perhaps because they were first enunciated by those who had seceded from Freud even though originally properly trained according to his requirements.'

The volume opens with an introductory chapter in which the author explains his theoretical point of view and chief technical methods. This is followed by chapters on the various neurotic syndromes and certain of their complications. These chapters contain numerous short case histories. There are also shorter chapters on alcoholism, drug addiction and the perversions. The author concludes with two chapters of general comment and conclusion. Although, as stated above, he is an eclectic who accepts valuable portions of numerous psycho-pathological systems, he has, nevertheless, been able to summarize neatly his own chief psycho-pathological preoccupation in one sentence : ' In the welter of clinical detail, of bewildering complexity, it is good to have some sheet-anchor of valid even if platitudinous generalization and I offer this one : that every patient with mental illness was more afraid than he could tolerate when he was a baby, and the faults in his psychic structure represent the gallant attempts to allay this intolerable feeling by the inadequate means at his disposal.'

Much of the clinical comment suggests that the author's technical method, laying stress as it does on so-called ' nuclear experiences ' and involving a tutored re-living of past experiences in the present tense, is forced and artificial. Nevertheless a great deal of the author's description is extremely interesting and it seems probable that his intuitive handling and direct approach to neurotic patients is far more effective than his descriptive psycho-pathology would suggest. Many of his interpretations are based on quick and acute observation, and one cannot but marvel at the extent and range of his clinical experience.

In considering the author's conclusions one cannot avoid the impression that, however much one may sympathize with his wish to extend the scope of psycho-pathological theory, the length to which he pushes some of his conclusions will lead many readers to understand the scepticism of the orthodox psychiatrist with regard to far reaching psycho-pathological explanations. This is due in part to the rather abstract and mystical conclusions reached in the last chapter of the book. Largely, however, it is due to the absence of one vital analytical conception, meaningless to

the non-analyst and largely responsible for the unfortunately necessary exclusiveness of psycho-analysis. This is the conception of an unconscious which has never been anything except unconscious—a conception without which psycho-pathology lacks all body and substance.

Elizabeth Rosenberg.

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Reassurance and Relaxation. By T. S. Rippon and Peter Fletcher. (George Routledge & Sons Ltd., London, 1940. Pp. 221. Price 6*s*.)

Although this well-written little book will not be of much theoretical interest to readers of this JOURNAL, it is of value at the present time because it presents succinctly in a semi-popular way the technique of a form of relatively rapid psychotherapy which is widely practised to-day in various modifications. The patient is first taught how to lie with all his muscles relaxed fully, and in this way a hypnoidal state is produced. He then becomes more accessible to the influence of the therapist and associates more freely. Simple explanations of psychosomatic relationships lead up to an investigation with the patient of the meaning of his anxieties, largely in terms of the ' strategy of behaviour ' which he has acquired, beginning in childhood. The patient is then encouraged to adopt behaviour better adapted to reality.

Under war-time conditions the book will be of interest to those accustomed to deeper methods, and of real help to inexperienced psychotherapists.

W. Hewitt Gillespie.

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Diseases of the Nervous System. By W. Russell Brain. Second Edition. (Oxford University Press, 1940. Pp. xx + 950. Price 30*s*.)

This JOURNAL is not the place for a general assessment of the second edition of this now well-known text-book of neurology. It contains an additional chapter entitled ' Psychological Manifestations of Organic Nervous Disease ', which deals briefly with hallucinations, disorders of memory, disorders of mood, and dementia. In connection with disorders of memory, some importance is attributed to repression as a factor inhibiting recall ; but in the discussion of dementia no mention is made of the regression so characteristic of this condition.

The neuroses are considered mainly in relation to neurological diagnosis, as is proper in a text-book of neurology. As regards treatment, while the author holds that the symptomatic treatment of hysteria is inadequate, he states that analytical methods are often rendered difficult by lack of intelligence or resistance in the patient, and in practice he seems to lay most stress on symptomatic measures. For long-standing anxiety reactions

he advocates psycho-analysis ' or some modification thereof '. In severe cases of obsessional neurosis, prolonged rest, isolation in a suitable home and psychotherapy are regarded as essential.

There is little in these sections with which one would seriously disagree, having regard to the strict limits which the author has set himself.

W. Hewitt Gillespie.

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Subjection of Woman and Traditions of Men. By Maud Glasgow. (M. I. Glasgow, New York, 1940. Pp. 341.)

This book has as its subject—as can be seen from the title—the subjection and inferior position of women through the ' different ages and climes ', also her position in the various civilizations and religions. To review this book is easiest done by quoting from it. On pp. 12 and 13 the author refers to Havelock Ellis's assertion that ' females have a more tenacious hold upon life because, from nature's point of view, they are of more importance '. The author goes on to explain this statement by quoting among other afflictions occurring more frequently in men than in women, hernia, moral imbecility, sex perversion, juvenile delinquency, insanity, arteriosclerosis and sudden death. In the preface, in which she deplores, as throughout the book, the abuses women are exposed to, she speaks of ' the repulsive Kalmuck, with his grey, flat, sinister face, who beats his wife into submission . . .'

Olga Knopf.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

[*Appearance in this list does not preclude subsequent notice.*]

A. BOOKS

Personality and Mental Illness : an Essay in Psychiatric Diagnosis. By John Bowlby. (London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1940. Pp. xii + 280. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Psychiatric Dictionary. By Leland Hinsie and Jacob Shatzky. (New York : Oxford University Press. Pp. 559. Price, $10.50.)

Psychiatric Social Work. By Lois Meredith French. (New York : The Commonwealth Fund. Pp. 344. Price, $2.25.)

Revelation and the Unconscious. By R. Scott Frayn. (London : Epworth Press. 1940. Pp. 240. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Sex in Development. By Carney Landis and Other Authors. (New York : Paul B. Hoeber, Inc. Pp. 329. Price, $3.75.)

Sex Morality To-morrow. By Kenneth Ingram. (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1940, Pp. 173. Price, 6*s.*)

The Child's Discovery of Death : a Study in Child Psychology. By Sylvia Anthony. (London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1940. Pp. xvi + 231. Price, 11*s.* 6*d.*)

The Doctor and the Difficult Child. By William Moodie. (New York : The Commonwealth Fund. Pp. 214. Price, $1.50.)

The Physiology of Sex. By Kenneth Walker. (Harmondsworth : Allen Lane, Penguin Books. 1940. Pp. xi + 157. Price, 6*d.*)

The Psychology of Fear and Courage. By Edward Glover. (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books. 1940. Pp. 128. Price, 6d.)

Tristan. By Hannah Close. (London : Andrew Dakers, Ltd. 1940. Pp. xii + 342. Price, 9*s.* 6*d.*)

B. PERIODICALS

Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry (Chicago).

British Medical Journal (London).

Bulletin of the American Psychoanalytic Association.

Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic (Topeka).

Man (London).

Medical Record (New York).

Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research (London).

Psychiatry (Washington).

Psychological Abstracts (Providence).

The American Imago (Boston).

The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy (Sydney).

The Journal of the American Medical Association (Chicago).

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly (New York).

The Psychoanalytic Review (New York).

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PYSCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY
EDWARD GLOVER, GENERAL SECRETARY

Reports of Proceedings of Societies

Owing to war-time conditions it has been found impracticable to adhere to the existing system of publishing Society, Clinic and Training reports in collected form. Until further notice reports will be published in the order in which they are received. The Editor hopes, however, that all branch Institutes and Training Secretaries will make even greater efforts than formerly to keep their reports up to date. They should be sent quarterly. Special efforts should be made to complete reports dealing with the period September, 1939, to July, 1940. Where possible two duplicates should be made and posted at intervals of a week.

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1939

October 4. In Memoriam Sigmund Freud. Discussion of war-time emergency measures.

November 1. Miss E. F. Sharpe (read by Dr. Payne) : ' The Interplay of Internal and Environmental Factors Determining a Sublimation in Music and an Inhibition with Regard to it '.

December 6. Dr. M. Balint in collaboration with the late Dr. Alice Balint (read by Dr. M. Balint) : ' On Transference and Counter-Transference '.

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January 10. Dr. M. Schmideberg : ' On Sublimation '.

February 7. Dr. W. H. Gillespie : ' Fetishism '.

March 6. Mrs. S. Isaacs : ' A Contribution to the Study of the Therapeutic Process '.

April 17. Dr. I. Matte Blanco : ' Notes on a Problem of the Relation between the Individual and the Environment '.

May 1. Dr. M. Schmideberg : ' Objective Anxiety and Reality-Testing '.

June 5. Dr. M. Balint : ' Ego-Strength and Ego-Pedagogy '.

June 12. Symposium on ' Psychological Factors in War-Time Morale with Special Reference to the " Quisling " Type of Situations that induce this Reaction '. Opened by Dr. E. Jones.

June 19. Dr. I. Matte Blanco: ' On Introjection and the Processes of " Psychic Metabolism " (Abraham) '.

E. Glover.

SENDAI PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

1939

June. M. Yamamura: ' The Negative Therapeutic Reaction '.

September. Professor Marui: ' Reminiscence of Freud '.

September. M. Yamamura: ' Insulin-Shock and Cardiazol-Convulsions Treatment of Psychoses '.

November. Professor Marui: ' Prognosis of Hysteria '.

November. Professor Marui: ' Acute (Abortive) Paranoia '.

December. M. Yamamura: ' On Enuresis '.

1940

February. M. Yamamura: ' On Cleptomania '.

June. Professor Marui: ' On Psycho-Analysis '.

June. H. Kosawa: ' On Psycho-Analysis '.

M. Yamamura.

A report has been received of the Meeting of the Topeka Psycho-analytic Society on September 28, 1940. Dr. Lewy read a clinical paper on ' The Return of the Repressed '.